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THE NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT
INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM
TO PROTECT GROUP RIGHTS: A CASE STUDY OF
THE KURDS
Olivia Q. Goldman*
Democracy within nations requires respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, as set forth in the [United Nations] Charter. It requires as well a deeper
understanding and respect for the rights of minorities and respect for the needs of
the more vulnerable groups of society, .... This is not only a political matter. The
social stability needed for productive growth is nurtured by conditions in which
people can readily express their will.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The responsibility of states toward groups within their territory has come
under increased debate within members of the international community. Despite
the adoption by the United Nations of the most definitive statement to date on
group rights, the repression of groups remains unabated. As events in the
Balkans illustrate, the situation of minorities has in fact deteriorated with the
decline of totalitarian regimes around the world. The removal of oppressive
government forces has allowed group hostilities to rage unhindered. The
violation of minority rights often results in violence, as governments pursue their
repressive policies and groups struggle to protect themselves and gain interna-
tional attention for their plight. The outcome of these conflicts has extensive
repercussions in terms of human suffering and political upheaval. Current
procedures for the protection of groups and the implementation of their rights are
* B.A., J.D., Candidate for LL.M. at the University of Amsterdam. This paper was written with the
support of the Ford Foundation.
1. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of
the Security Council on Jan. 31, 1992, 46, U.N. Doc. S/24111 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 956 (1992).
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inadequate. They fail to allow for group participation and their application is
often mired by political maneuvering.
Given the potential for conflicts among groups, states have a vested interest
in finding innovative solutions which address groups' concerns within the context
of the state-based system. Only an independent, non-political body can avoid the
political maneuvering which has plagued the current enforcement mechanisms.
As a result of the end of the Cold War and the increased attention to ethnic
conflicts, the political opportunity now exists to create the kind of mechanism
which can effectively enforce the rights to which groups, not just individuals, are
entitled.
This paper will assess the possibilities for effective resolution of conflicting
group rights. First, it will begin with an exploration of what constitutes a
"group" for the purposes of entitlement to rights and protections under
international law. Second, it will examine the development of group rights,
including an analysis of current rights. Third, traditional procedures for
implementation of these rights will be discussed and their deficiencies illustrated
by a case study of the Kurds. Additionally, this paper will address the need for
the international community to take advantage of current political shifts to
develop alternative procedures for enforcement. Finally, this paper will examine
recommendations for a mechanism within an independent non-political organiza-
tion, such as the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization.
II. MINORITIES AND OTHER GROUPS
Groups are collective entities that exist as units and not simply as
aggregates of individuals. A group right, as distinguished from an individual
right, is granted to an individual to exercise in combination with others, and is
concerned with collective experience.2 Collective experience is distinct from
individual experience, and a violation of an individual's right is not necessarily
a violation of a group right.
There are numerous groups in any society, but not all of them enjoy
internationally protected rights. In fact, "no state ... has a population so
homogeneous that it cannot be subdivided into smaller groups of greater
homogeneity simply by altering the standards of what constitutes a 'distinct
group.' ' 3  In order to qualify for international rights and protections, an
association must be deemed a "group." Scholars and legal practitioners have
developed a system of criteria for group qualification that is comprised of two
factors, one subjective and the other objective.
The first criterion is the subjective self-perception of the group as distinct
from others, and the desire of the individual members of the group to identify
themselves as a group. This self-perception, while critical, is not sufficient to
2. For example, an individual belonging to a group may have her freedom of speech suppressed without
implicating a group right if the group as a whole is able to communicate. Vernon Van Dyke, Collective
Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought, 44 J. POL. 21, 23 (1982).
3. LEE C. BucHEIT, SUCCESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 28 (1978).
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constitute a group.4 The group must fulfill the second criterion, which is the
existence of objective characteristics which distinguish the group from the
remainder of the population. Examples of such characteristics include history,
geography, ethnicity, economics, language and religion. It is important to keep
in mind that though this criteria is basically objective, there is a subjective
element to it as well: it is the group's belief in a shared history, religion, etc.,
rather than an empirically provable relationship, which is most important for the
purposes of group definition.5
Several studies have attempted to define what constitutes a group for
purposes of international law, and they have utilized various terms. The most
prevalent term is "minority," although other possibilities include "community,
6
"communality,"7 and "social group."'  Unfortunately, there is no uniformly
accepted definition for a "minority,"9 despite the dominance of its use. The
most widely accepted definition is provided by Francesco Capotorti, a Special
Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities. He defines a minority group as:
A group which is numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state and
in a non-dominant position, whose members possess ethnic, religious or linguistic
characteristics which differ from those of the rest of the population and who, if only
implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture,
traditions, religion or language."0
In addition to the above listed subjective and objective criteria, "minority" also
has the political implication that the group is in a nondominant position in the
state in which it exists.
A related concept is that of "peoplehood." The following definition of
"people" was provided by a group of experts which convened in 1990 under the
auspices of the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO):"
4. NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 34 (1991); but see
Walker Connor, Nationalism and Political Illegitimacy, in CANADIAN REVIEW OF STUDIES IN NATIONALISM
201, 207 (1978) (arguing that self-perception is the defining characteristic for groups).
5. See Walker Connor, The Politics on Ethnonationalism, 27 J. INT'L AFF. 1, 3-4 (1973).
6. U.N. Secretary-General, Definition and Classification of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4ISub.285 (1949)
at 4; Greek-Bulgarian Communities, P.C.I.J. 1930 (defining "community").
7. Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1001, 1002
(1983).
8. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 148 (1978).
9. United Nations Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti noted that the most prevalent obstacles to a
general agreement on a definition of "minority" are the issues of the numerical ratio between the minority and
the population as a whole, the need for a minimum size of the group, the interaction between the objective and
subjective criteria, and the inclusion or exclusion of aliens. FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS
OF PERSONS BELONGING TO ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/-
Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.78.XIV.I (1979).
10. Id. at 7. The scholarly work on minorities and their histories is enormous. See Definition and
Classification of Minorities, supra note 6; Oldrich Andrysek, Report on the Definition of Minorities, 14
(Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, SIM Special No. 8); Francesco Capotorti, Minorities, in 8
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 385 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1985); Louis B. Sohn, The Rights of Minorities, in
THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 27 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
11. UNESCO Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Rights of Peoples (Paris, Feb. 1990) (on file
with author).
1994]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
A people for the rights of peoples in international law, including the right to self-
determination, has the following characteristics:
1. A group of individual human beings who enjoy some or all of the
following common features:
(a) a common historical tradition;
(b) racial or ethnic identity;
(c) cultural homogeneity;
(d) linguistic unity;
(e) religious or ideological affinity;
(f) territorial connection;
(g) common economic life.
2. The group must be of a certain number who need not be large (e.g.,
the people of micro states), but must be more than a mere association
of individuals within a state.
3. The group as a whole must have the will to be identified as a people
or the consciousness of being a people-allowing that groups or some
members of such group, though sharing the foregoing characteristics,
may not have the will or consciousness.
4. Possibly, the group must have institutions or other means of
expressing its common characteristics and will for identity.'2
Although the terms "people" and "minority" are closely related, "minority"
is broader. It refers to a political situation in which a group, which may or may
not constitute a "people," is in a non-dominant position within its state.
Another related term is "indigenous peoples." Although typically an
indigenous population will also constitute a minority, and is therefore entitled to
the same rights as other groups, it is nevertheless treated separately within the
United Nations system. Thus it will only be considered tangentially in this
paper. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, the term "group" will be used
interchangeably with "minority."
The term "group" has the advantage of not implying numerical inferiority,
since a group that is numerically superior may nevertheless be in a non-dominant
position. While a group in common parlance refers to a collection of individuals
sharing common characteristics,in international law the notion requires the
presence of the above-mentioned unifying, spontaneous and permanent factors,
both subjective and objective. These groups usually fall into three general
categories: 1) groups based on ethnic or racial associations, which include
associations based on color, descent, and nationality; 2) religious groups; and 3)
groups organized around linguistic or cultural associations.
3
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GROUP RIGHTS
The development of group rights has traditionally been divided into three
periods. These periods include:
a) the early era of non-systematic protection of minorities in international treaties,
b) the organized period of minority protection between the two world wars
embodied in the League of Nations System, and
c) the developments following World War II.
12. Id.
13. See LERNER, supra note 4, at 30-31 (detailing organizational division).
[Vol. 2:45
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A. The Early Period14
International human rights law began as an attempt to protect groups,
primarily religious groups, from discrimination through emphasis on tolerance
rather than rights.' s The origin of the international protection of groups can be
traced to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, concluded between France, the Holy
Roman Empire, and their respective allies. 6 The terms of this treaty granted
religious freedom to the German Protestant minority. Throughout the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, several other treaties included clauses providing
protections for individuals or groups with religious beliefs that differed from
those of the governing majority."'
In the nineteenth century, as a result of the emerging ideology of
egalitarianism, the protection of minority groups expanded beyond religious
groups to include protections for other minorities. These protections, appearing
for the first time in multilateral treaties, provided for equality in civil and
political rights, as well as for freedom of worship.' 8 This expanded protection
was evident in the Congress of Vienna of 1815, which considered the fate of
ethnic Poles living within the former Napoleonic Empire. The Final Act of the
Congress pledges that the contracting parties provide institutions which guarantee
the preservation of the Polish nationality.'9 Other treaties that included group
protections during this era include the Treaty of Berlin (1878), which contained
provisions prohibiting ethnic or religious discrimination against Turks, Greeks,
and Romanians under Bulgarian rule, and the International Covenant of
Constantinople (1881), which contained stipulations relating to the equality of
Muslims in territories governed by the Greeks.20
The protections afforded groups in this early era were far from complete.
Nevertheless, they laid the foundation for subsequent mandates by the
international community concerning what had previously been considered solely
within a state's domestic jurisdiction: the treatment by a state of its citizens.
14. For an excellent survey of the early treatment of minorities, see Muldoon, The Development of Group
Rights, in J. SIGLER, MINORITY RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 31 (1983).
15. Capotorti asserts that the priority given to religious minorities results from the contrasts between the
tenets of tolerance and non-discrimination within religious ideologies, and the reality of persecution.
CAPOTORTI, supra note 9, at 1. However, Hurst Hannum asserts that given the historical congruence of
religious and secular authority during this period, a recognition of a religious group's rights amounted to a
recognition of the power of certain political groups. HURST HANNum, SOVEREIGNTY, SELF DETERMINATION
AND AUTONOMY: ACCOMMODATING CONFLICTING GROUP RIGHTS 50 (1990).
16. Treaty of Westphalia, Jan. 11, 1649, Fr.-Holy Roman Empire, 1 Consol. T.S. 383.
17. See Treaty of Paris, Feb. 10, 1763, Fr.-Spain-Gr. Brit., 42 Consol. T.S. 279 (protecting Roman
Catholics living in Canadian territories); Treaty of Nimeguen, Sept. 11, 1678, 14 Consol. T.S. 437
(guaranteeing freedom of worship to the Roman Catholic minority living in territories ceded by France to
Holland); Treaty of Oliva, Apr. 23-May 2, 1660, 6 Consol. T.S. 9 (protecting Roman Catholics in Livonia).
18. See CAPOTORTI, supra note 9, at 2.
19. 2 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1814-1815, at 7-55 (James Ridgway ed., 1839).
20. For an analysis of the development of the recognition of the rights of ethnic and linguistic minorities
in domestic legislation, see INis L. CLAUDE, JR., NATIONAL MINORITIES, AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 31-33
(1955).
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B. Minority Treaties and the League of Nations
In 1919, following World War I, "the most conscious and comprehensive
attempt to protect ethnic and other minorities through international legal
means"' was developed under the auspices of the League of Nations in the
form of minority treaties, which incorporated protections from earlier. treaty
provisions. They attempted to establish a systematic and comprehensive method
of guaranteeing human rights. Despite this, the minority treaties were not
intended to have universal application. Rather, they addressed concerns specific
to Europe, and not every European state was subject to their mandate. The states
developing the system tended to exclude themselves from application of these
minority protection provisions.
The minority treaties can be divided into three categories, although the
substantive protections included in each were relatively similar. The first group
of treaties applied to the defeated states of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Turkey. The second category of treaties applied to newly created states, and to
those states whose borders were fundamentally altered to accommodate particular
minority problems. Examples within this category include Czechoslovakia,
Greece, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Finally, treaties applying to certain
states, such as Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Iraq, were required to
provide for minority protections as a condition to their admission to the League
of Nations.22
The minority treaties sought to achieve the twin aims of granting legal
equality to individuals and preserving the groups' characteristics and tradi-
tions.23  Among the protections frequently guaranteed were:
the right to equality of treatment and nondiscrimination; the right to citizenship,
although a minority group member could opt to retain another citizenship if desired;
21. Hurst Hannum, Contemporary Developments-in the International Protection of the Rights of
Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1432 (1992).
22. Id.
23. These goals were clearly enunciated in an Advisory Opinion concerning Minority Schools in Albania
by the Permanent Court of International Justice. Regarding an attempt by the Albanian government to close
all private schools, and the likely effect of that decision on the material equality of Albania's Greek minority,
the Court stated:
The idea underlying the treaties for the protection of minorities is to secure for certain elements
incorporated in a State, the population of which differs from them in race, language or religion, the
possibility of living peacefully alongside the population and co-operating amicably with it, while at
the same time preserving the characteristics which distinguish them from the majority, and satisfying
the ensuing special needs.
In order to attain this object, two things are regarded as particularly necessary, and have formed
the subject of provisions in these treaties. The first is to ensure that nationals belonging to racial,
religious or linguistic minorities shall be placed in every respect on a footing of perfect equality with
other nationals of the State. The second is to ensure for the minority element suitable means for the
preservation of their racial peculiarities, their traditions and their national characteristics.
Tiese two requirements are indeed closely interlocked, for there would be no true equality
between a majority and a minority if the latter were deprived of its own institutions, and were
consequently compelled to renounce that which constitutes the very essence of its being a minority.
Advisory Opinion No. 64, Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B), at 17.
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the right to use one's own language; the right of minorities to establish and control
their own charitable, religious, and social institutions; a state obligation to provide
"equitable" financial support to minority schools ... and other institutions; and
recognition of the supremacy of laws protecting minority rights over other
statutes.2
Various mechanisms were created to enforce treaty provisions. Minorities
Committees supervised the implementation of these rights and minorities
themselves had the right of petition to bring an alleged infraction to the attention
of the League. Also established by the members of the League was the
Permanent Court of International Justice, which had jurisdiction to intervene in
cases where there was a difference of opinion concerning the interpretation or
application of minority provisions. This introduction of judicial supervision is
considered one of the most important innovations of the League system for the
protection of minorities.25
Although this system ultimately collapsed along with the League of Nations,
it did provide some tangible results. These included the establishment of
minority schools in several countries, the rehabilitation of neglected groups, the
resistance to forced assimilation, the inclusion of minority groups in the political
processes of several countries, the success of various methods of mediation and
conciliation, and the decisions concerning minorities pronounced by the
Permanent Court of International Justice.26 Many of these decisions retain their
relevance today. This last development, the international court system, was of
crucial importance. The ultimate benefit was the general recognition by states
that the treatment of their citizens is an international concern.
C. The Treatment of Groups Following World War II
1. Group Rights within the United Nations
The machinery established for the protection of minorities by the League
of Nations collapsed along with the League in 1946. The events of World War
II fundamentally altered the situation of minorities,27 and with the establishment
of the United Nations a new approach to the issue of group rights and
protections developed. When the international community gathered in San
Francisco to create a new mechanism for international cooperation, there was
great hostility to the League system. This affected the member states' opinions
concerning minority protection. There was a strong belief that "[m]inorities in
individual states must never again be given the character of internationally
recognized political and legal units, with the possibility of again becoming the
source of disturbances."2 In an effort to limit this explosive impact, the focus
in the protection of human rights shifted from groups to individual rights and
24. Hannum, supra note 21, at 1432. For a thorough discussion of these provisions, see CLAUDE, supra
note 20, at 17-20.
25. CAPOTORTI, supra note 9, at 24.
26. See JACOB ROBINSON ET AL., WERE ThE MINORITY TREATIES A FAILURE? 261 (1943).
27. See Jacob Robinson, International Protection of Minorities, A Global View, 1 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS.
61, 80-82 (1971).
28. Id. at 77 (statement of Eduard Benes, Chairman, Czechoslovak National Council-in-Exile).
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freedoms. The prevailing understanding was that if individual human rights were
properly guaranteed, special provisions for minority rights were unnecessary.29
The individualist bent of this early stage is evident in the U.N. Charter and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration),30 neither
of which refers to groups.3' The Charter proclaims the principles of universal
respect for human rights and fundamental freedom, equality, and nondiscrimina-
tion.32 The Preamble states, the Participating States "reaffirm faith in funda-
mental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women and of nations large and small."33 These statements
are all made in the context of individual rights.
The international community attempted indirectly to protect minorities
through the principle of nondiscrimination. Prohibitions against discrimination
are included in the Charter, the Universal Declaration, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (Political Rights Covenant), and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 4 Nondiscrimination is also
featured in a number of specialized international agreements and declarations.35
The principle of nondiscrimination prohibits distinctions based on group
characteristics such as race, religion, language, or nationality. Nevertheless, its
focus remains on the individual rather than the group. With reference to
nondiscrimination Capotorti concluded, "since 1945 this principle has been
included in the context of the protection of the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of all human beings, and not the context of measures designed
29. Minority Rights, U.N. Fact Sheet No. 18, at 3. Adeno Addis asserts that there are two causes for the
shift toward an individualistic perspective in the years following World War II. Firstly, the shift was in
response to the atrocities committed by the Nazis, which many attributed to "group thinking." Secondly, the
shift reflected the individualistic ideology of the United States. Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarian-
ism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615, 638 (1992).
30. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., Part I, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
31. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.; Universal Declaration, supra note 30.
32. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER pmbl', art. 1, 1 3, arts. 13, 55, 56, 62, 76.
33. Id. at pmbl.
34. U.N. CHARTER; Universal Declaration, supra note 30; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 174 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Political Rights
Covenant]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
35. Examples of specialized international instruments addressing the principle of non-discrimination
include: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Convention on Racial Discrimination]; Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered
into force Sept. 3, 1981); Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (1981)
[hereinafter Declaration on Religious Intolerance]; Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1990); ILO Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect
to Employment and Occupation, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force June 15, 1960);
Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Dec. 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93 (entered into force May 22,
1962); DECLARArION ON RACEAND RAcIAL PREJUDICE, Nov. 27, 1978, H.R. Compilation 135, U.N. Sales No.
E.88.XIV.1 (1988).
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especially to protect minorities." 6 Thus, the principle of equal treatment for
individual members of minority groups became entrenched in the international
legal order.37
Progress toward the recognition of group rights was slow. Nevertheless, the
United Nations included the issue of minorities in various instruments. One of
the earliest recognitions of the vulnerability of minorities was the adoption in
1948 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Genocide Convention). 38  The Genocide Convention prohibits any
act committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
racial or religious group. It is directed specifically against the destruction of
groups per se (excluding political groups that were not thought to have sufficient
permanency), rather than targeting violations of individual rights. Under the
Genocide Convention, claims may be brought before an international criminal
court.3 9 This court, however, has yet to be established.
Other important developments related to the protection of groups include the
establishment of the U.N. Human Rights Commission (Commission) under the
auspices of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The Commission's
purpose was to develop and implement provisions of the Charter relating to
human rights and fundamental freedoms. To this end, the Commission
established a Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities (Sub-Commission), which focused specifically on minorities from
1947 to 1954. From 1954 until 1971 the Sub-Commission focused almost
exclusively on discrimination. In 1971, the issue of minorities regained attention
with a decision to undertake a study on the Rights of Persons belonging to
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.' Several additional studies
concerning the protection of minorities were commissioned by the U.N., and the
Secretary-General prepared several documents on this issue at the request of the
Commission and Sub-Commission.
The most important work of the U.N. in this era was the drafting and
adoption of Article 27 of the Political Rights Covenant.4 Article 27 provides:
36. CAPOTORTI, supra note 9, at 27. But see Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle
overAutonomy Regimes for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1535, 1543 (1991) (contending that the rights
of minority members to use their own language, to practice their religion, or to associate are necessarily
exercised jointly by individuals, and therefore such individual rights are inherently collective).
37. Note that the equality sought was "formal" equality, that is equal treatment, rather than "material"
equality, which refers to economic, social and cultural equality. See E.W. VIERDAG, THE CONCEPT OF
DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW wITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS 32-47 (1973).
38. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, concluded Dec. 9, 1945,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. Article II lists acts
which constitute genocide, including: "(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." Id. at art. fl.
39. For critiques of the Genocide Convention, see Richard W. Edwards, Jr., Contributions of the Genocide
Convention to the Development of Contemporary International Law, 8 Omo N.U. L. REv. 300 (1981); Marian
Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L. L.
116 (1985); Burton M. Leiser, Victims of Genocide, 8 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 315 (1981).
40. CAPOTORTI, supra note 9. at 28.
41. Political Rights Covenant, supra note 34, at art. 27.
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In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their-own religion, or to use their own language.42
Several difficulties arose in the interpretation of Article 27. The primary
area of contention revolved around the use of the words "persons belonging to
such minorities," and whether this was intended to grant group as well as
individual rights. While some assert that the wording avoids giving groups an
international personality, it nevertheless has important practical ramifications for
groups.4 3 Capotorti notes that although Article 27 accords rights only to
individuals, this should be interpreted liberally in order to avoid superfluity.
Otherwise it would only grant liberties deducible from other provisions in the
Covenant. 44 The argument for a broad interpretation of Article 27 is supported
by the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging the
National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities by the U.N. General
Assembly which recognizes groups as such.45
Another concern associated with Article 27 is that the statement "[iun those
states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist" implies an intent
to recognize only well established minorities.' This would prevent recognition
of more recent groups. In addition, Article 27 refers only to ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities, omitting "national minorities." There have been some
developments aimed at broadening the scope of protections offered under Article
27 to include national minorities, with the caveat that the promotion of group
rights will not affect the territorial and political status of the state in which the
group lives.47 A final concern is with the lack of explicit reference to positive
measures to which the groups might be entitled. The emphasis of the article is
on preventing unequal treatment, rather than attempting to achieve social,
economic, or cultural equality, which in certain cases would require active steps
in favor of groups suffering the effects of long-standing discrimination.
The international community gradually realized that the focus on the
individual and the use of the principle of nondiscrimination had failed to
adequately protect the rights of individuals as members of groups, let alone
protect groups themselves.4' After the wave of decolonization in the 1960s,
42. Id.
43. See Addis, supra note 29, at 638 (arguing that Article 27 protects individual's right to freedom of
association rather than the rights of groups); see also Sohn, supra note 10, at 274.
44. CAPOTORTI, supra note 9, at 4.
45. Declaration of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities, Dec. 18, 1992, G.A. Res. 135, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (1992) [hereinafter
Declaration of the Rights of Persons]. For example, Article 1 calls on States to protect and promote the
national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their territories. Also, Article
4 instructs States to create favorable conditions for the expression of minority characteristics and the
development of their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs.
46. See LERNER, supra note 4, at 16.
47. See U.N. Doec. E/CN.4/NGO/231 (1979).
48. See Natan Lerner, The Evolution of Minority Rights in International Law, in PEOPLES AND MINoRITIES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 77, 81 (C. Brdlmann et al., eds., 1993) (exploring violations of individual and group
rights despite rule of non-discrimination).
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emphasis shifted to the last ten provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which have a collective nature.49 A transition occurred from the idea
of protection to a more general notion of inherent rights. Thus the shift from the
earlier approach was two-fold: from protections to rights and from individuals
to groups.
The beginning of this shift from protections to rights is evident in the 1960
UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education. ° In this Conven-
tion signatories agreed to allow minority populations control over their own
educational activities, including the maintenance of schools and the use or
education of their own language.5 ' Although the Convention provided for
educational instruction in the group's own language, this was "dependent on the
education policy of each State;" the Convention recommended that this "should
not be allowed if it prevented the minority population from understanding the
culture and language of the community as a whole, interfered with their
participation in the state's activities, or harmed national sovereignty. ' 52
Other examples of the shift toward group rights include the 1957 ILO
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Populations, 3 and the 1978
UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice.'M The Convention
recognizes the rights of indigenous populations and asserts that special measures
should be adopted for the preservation of their institutions, persons, property, and
labor. These special measures must be adopted as long as the population's
social, economic, and cultural conditions prevent them from enjoying the benefits
of the general laws of the country to which they belong. The Convention warns,
however, that these special measures must not be used to create or continue a
state of segregation.55 Twenty years later, the UNESCO Declaration on Race
and Racial Prejudice emphasized the need to protect the identity and develop-
ment of groups aside from indigenous populations, and stressed the need for
affirmative action for groups which had been disadvantaged or were the object
of discrimination.56
Arguably the most ambitious instrument in the area of group rights is the
U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.57
The Convention imposes on States the obligation to put an end to all forms of
racial discrimination. States are required to work within their own constitutional
framework to declare racist organizations illegal if they are likely to incite
49. Universal Declaration, supra note 30. Included in the last ten articles are freedom of association and
assembly (Art. 20), economic, social, and cultural rights (Art. 22), the right to form trade unions (Art. 23), and
the right to education (Art. 26).
50. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, supra note 35, at art. 5.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. International Labor Organization Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous
and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, June 26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247
(entered into force June 2, 1959) [hereinafter ILO Convention]. The Convention was revised in 1989 to
encourage greater participation in decision-making by indigenous groups themselves.
54. DECLARATION ON RACE AND RACIAL PREJUDICE, supra note 35.
55. ILO Convention, supra note 53, at art. 3, para. 2a.
56. DECLARATION ON RACE AND RACIAL PREJUDICE, supra note 35.
57. Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 35.
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discrimination. It also authorizes, but does not mandate, special active measures
necessary to secure adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups, such
as preferential treatment for those groups that have traditionally suffered
discrimination.58 In Article 5, members of "ethnic minorities" are guaranteed
equal treatment in the enjoyment of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights.59
Another important document is the U.N. Declaration Against Intolerance
and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted in 1981. 60 Particularly
relevant is Article 6 which enunciates rights of a collective nature that can only
be exercised by a group.6' Although only a declaration and not a binding
treaty, it is nevertheless an important breakthrough for religious groups in their
struggle to achieve some of the protection currently granted to racial minorities.
In addition to declarations and conventions, the United Nations has been
active in commissioning various initiatives related to group rights. Special
Rapporteur Capotorti's Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic,
Religious, and Linguistic Minorities was only the first of such activities.62
Other initiatives include the appointment of Special Rapporteurs by the
Commission and Sub-Commission to consider specific aspects of racial
intolerance and discrimination,63 and the appointment by the Sub-Commission
in 1988 of one of its members to consider means of facilitating effective
solutions to minority problems.'
In 1992 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the
Declaration of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities (Declaration).65  The Preamble recognizes that
protecting minority rights will "contribute to the political and social stability of
States in which they live."66 Despite the individualistic framing of the title, the
Declaration asserts that persons belonging to minorities may exercise their rights
collectively as well as individually.67 It also calls for positive state action to
promote and protect the development of minority languages, cultures, religions,
and traditions, as well as to encourage full minority participation in the economic
progress of their country." In addition, states are instructed to consider the
interests of minorities when planning and implementing national policies.69 The
Declaration specifies however, that it does not affect the international obligations
58. Id.
59. Id. at art. 5.
60. Declaration on Religious Intolerance, supra note 35.
61. Id. at art. 6.
62. CAPOTORTI, supra note 9.
63. See Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Commission on Human Rights, E.S.C. Res. 1986/20, U.N. ESCOR
Supp. No. 2 at 67, U.N. Doc. E/1986/22 (1986); Elimination of All Forms of Racial Intolerance, Sub-Comm'n
Res. 1983/31, U.N. Doc. E/Cn.4/1984/3 (1984) at 98.
64. See Asbjom Eide, Second Progress Report on Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful
and Constructive Solution of Problems Involving Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/37 (submitted July 1, 1992).
65. Declaration of the Rights of Persons, supra note 45.
66. Id. at pmbl.
67. Id. at art. 3.
68. Id. at art. 4.
69. Id. at art. 5.
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of states concerning persons belonging to minorities; Nor does it prejudice the
enjoyment of all persons of universally recognized human rights; or condone
activities which run counter to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political
independence of states.70
The Declaration, in combination with the U.N. documents noted above,
categorizes group rights as follows:
(1) The Right to Physical Existence: This right was initially guaranteed in the
Genocide Convention.7' It has subsequently been recognized as customary
international law, which is therefore binding on non-signers. In addition, the
prevention and punishment of genocide is considered jus cogens, a peremptory
norm of international law from which no derogation is possible.
2
(2) The Right to Nondiscrimination: This right is well established in several U.N.
documents as a customary norm of international law. 73 In addition, it is effective-
ly argued that the prohibition against racial, and possibly religious, discrimination
is jus cogens.74 There is also an argument that the principle of nondiscrimination
prohibits material as well as formal discrimination.
(3) The Right to Self-Determination: This right, as guaranteed in the Charter and
several Covenants, ' is reserved for minorities that also constitute "peoples."76
Self-determination is the right to the free determination of internal and external
political status, and encompasses political, economic, social, and cultural aspects.
The exercise of theprinciple of self-determination includes integration, association,
and independence. The right of self-determination must be balanced with other
principles of international law, such as the principle of territorial integrity.
78
(4) The Right to Maintain a Distinct Identity (the right to be different): The right
to be different has been included in several international instruments, notably the
Declaration of the Rights of Persons. 9  This general entitlement, sometimes
labeled a cultural right, includes the right to maintain separate institutions,
70. Id. at art. 8.
71. Genocide Convention, supra note 38.
72. The idea that a general rule can develop from a treaty and achieve a binding character independent
of its treaty obligation was recognized by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 4, 41-45 (Feb. 20, 1969). In regard to the Genocide
Convention, the Court noted that the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized
by civilized nations as binding, even without treaty obligations. Furthermore, these obligations arejus cogens
and are therefore non-derogable. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.CJ. 4, 12 (May 28, 1951).
73. See supra note 35 and accompanying text describing principle of non-discrimination.
74. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 513 (3rd ed., 1979).
75. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 30, at art. 1, 1 2; Political Rights Covenant, supra note 34, at Common
Article 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 34.
76. Article 1 of the U.N. Charter includes in the purposes of the United Nations "to develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
U.N. CHARTER, supra note 30, at art 1.
77. "The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an
independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitutes
modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people." Declaration on Friendly Relations, art
5.
78. There are numerous articles considering the issue of self-determination, however, a complete
discussion of the topic is beyond the scope of this paper. See Thomas M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and
the Right to Succession, in PEOPLES AND MINoRIms IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Brolmann et al., eds., 1993);
Igor Grazin, The International Recognition of National Rights: The Baltic States' Case, 66 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1385 (1991); Rita E. Hauser, International Protection of Minorities and the Right of Self-Determination,
I ISR. Y.B. ON HuM. Rms. 92 (1971).
79. Declaration of the Rights of Persons, supra note 45, at art. 1.
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particularly in regard to education, culture, religion, and language.80 It is a
fundamental group right that can only be exercised in conjunction with others.
(5) The Right to Communicate: The right to communicate with other members of
the group, both domestically and internationally, is recognized in the Declaration"'
as well as the Declaration on Religious Intolerance.
8 2
(6) The Right to Political Participation: There is a growing recognition of the
right to political participation. This right is premised on the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, 3 the Political Rights Covenant,84 and the Declaration of the
Rights of Persons. 3 The right of representation at different levels of government
depends on the structure of the government, although it has been effectively
proposed as a fundamental right.86
(7) The Right to Positive Measures: The right to temporary special measures to
protect and promote the welfare of a group previously discriminated against has
been included in the Declaration of the Rights of Persons" and the Convention on
Racial Discrimination. 8 Other international documents addressing discrimination
in specific areas contain provisions authorizing preferential treatment measures.
8 9
It has been argued that Article 27 of the Covenant implicitly calls for active
participation by the state in its implementation, particularly at the cultural level.
Enormous resources are necessary to ensure full cultural development, and
without governmental assistance these rights would effectively disappear.
2. Group Rights within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe
The individualistic perspective of the United Nations influenced the
approach of regional organizations with respect to human rights.90 Neverthe-
less, group rights have been advanced: and the elaboration of group rights within
80. Id. at art. 2.
81. Id.
82. Declaration on Religious Intolerance, supra note 35, at art. 6.
83. Universal Declaration, supra note 30, at 71.
84. Political Rights Covenant, supra note 34, at art. 25.
85. Declaration of the Rights of Persons, supra note 45, at art. 2.
86. See Gregory Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539
(1992); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992);
Henry J. Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, I HARV. HUM. RTs. Y.B. 77 (1988). For an
examination of the importance of political participation to groups see Hauser, supra note 78. Hauser states:
When a separate ethnic or racial group demands broader participation in the life of the country, this
poses a problem not of individual rights, although each individual within the group may be unjustly
imposed upon, but of protection of the separate group qua group. Failure to recognize or grant to
the group its demand for greater participation in the government or economy of the state may
ultimately give rise to a movement for an independent state.
Id. at 93-94.
87. Declaration of the Rights of Persons, supra note 45, at art. 4.
88. Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 35, at arts. 1, 2.
89. See ILO Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect to Employment and Occupation, supra
note 35, at art. 5; Convention Against Discrimination in Education, supra note 35, at art. 3, para. c;
DECLARATION ON RACE AND RACIAL PREJUDICE, supra note 35.
90. Many of the regional human rights documents have provisions similar to the U.N. Charter and the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953)
[hereinafter European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights]; American Declaration on the Rights
and Duties of Man, pmbl., art. II, 9th Int'l Conference of American States (1953); African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights, arts. 2, 3, 19, 9 I.L.M. 58 (1981).
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the European context has proved the most advanced. Concern with group rights
is evident in the documents promulgated by the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).9' The CSCE does not promulgate treaties, but
establishes principles of behavior for states toward each other and toward their
own citizens. The first CSCE document, the Final Acts of Helsinki, included
several minority provisions, although the emphasis was on individual members
of the group rather than the group per se.' The rights addressed in the Final
Act were relatively general and broadly stated. For example, one provision
states:
The Participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the
right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford
them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental
freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere. 93
Minority provisions in the Final Act have been criticized for vagueness as
well as for their failure to refer to any minorities other than "national minori-
ties."94 Another criticism concerns the wording "on whose territory national
minorities exist," as it is believed to provide an escape mechanism for states
which refuse to acknowledge the existence of minorities in their territory. These
states could avoid all obligations by simply asserting that they have no
minorities.
A follow-up meeting was held in Vienna from November 1986 until January
1989. One of the objectives of this meeting was to elaborate further on minority
issues. The Concluding Document from the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting
established far-reaching minority rights, both negative and positive rights,
through the establishment of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE.95
Two provisions of the Vienna Concluding Document are particularly
relevant to group rights and deserve closer examination. Paragraph 18 pledges
the participating States to implement the minority provisions of the previous
CSCE documents, as well as other internationally binding instruments.
96
91. For an excellent analysis of the group rights guaranteed by the CSCE see Felix Ermacora, Rights of
Minorities and Self-Determination in the Framework of the CSCE, in THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE
HELSiNKI PROCESS: THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING AND ITS AFTERMATH 197-206 (A. Bloed & P. Van
Dyke eds., 1991).
92. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1. 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292
(1975) [hereinafter The Helsinki Final Act]. The Helsinki Final Act established four "baskets." These baskets
covered principles of interstate behavior, including human rights, provisions for improved cooperation in the
fields of economics and technology, and scientific and cultural cooperation.
93. Id. at Basket I, princ. VII. Other examples of provisions in the Final Act addressing minorities
include:
The Participating States, recognizing the contribution that national minorities or regional cultures can
make to cooperation among them in various fields of culture, intend, when such minorities or cultures
exist within their territory, to facilitate this contribution, taking into account the legitimate interests
of their members.
Id. at Baskei 1Il.
94. See, Ermacora, supra note 91, at 204.
95. Human Rights in the Concluding Document of the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Jan. 15, 1989,
reprinted in 10 HuM. RTS. L.J. 270, 277 (1989) [hereinafter Vienna Concluding Document].
96. Id.
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Specifically, participating States promise to refrain from discrimination against
persons belonging to minorities and to contribute to the realization of their
legitimate interests in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms.97
Paragraph 19 pledges the participating States to ensure conditions for the
promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of national
minorities in their territories, and to ensure their full equality.98 The right to
self-determination for peoples is confirmed in Paragraph 4.99
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Vienna Concluding Document is
the supervisory process of the Human Dimension Mechanism. This allows a
participating state to raise the issue of another state's noncompliance with CSCE
provisions at any time."ro The Vienna Concluding Document is important not
only for the specific rights it provides, but also because it represents a significant
development regarding the protection and rights of minority groups. Paragraphs
18 and 19 stress the protection of national minorities and explicitly emphasizes
the protection of group identification.'' In comparison with the Helsinki Final
Act, the Vienna Concluding Document significantly extended the recognition of
group rights.
The commitment to the Conference on the Human Dimension enunciated
in the Vienna Concluding Document was reaffirmed during the CSCE
Copenhagen Meeting held in 1990.102 Paragraphs 30 to 40 of the Copenhagen
Document contain strong and explicit commitments to minority protection, which
include fostering conditions necessary for the preservation and development of
minorities' ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity, and the resistance
of assimilation.0 3  Also included was a pledge by the states to respect the
rights of minority members to effective participation in public affairs." 4 The
most recent innovations of the CSCE regarding the Conference on the Human
Dimension are related to implementation and are therefore discussed below.
3. Group Rights within the Council of Europe
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights'0 5 was
drafted within the framework of the Council of Europe, an institution "which for
decades has promoted respect for human rights in the West."' 6 Although con-
cerned with many fundamental human rights, minority rights were notably
neglected. Recently, however, the Council of Europe has been active in
attempting to formulate an approach to minority rights. In May 1990, the
European Commission of Democracy through Law, an unofficial body of the
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 273.
100. Id. at 268-69.
101. Id. at 277.
102. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference




105. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 90.
106. Jonathan Eyal, Bordering on Chaos, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 16, 1992, at 19.
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Council of Europe, compiled a list of minority rights. In 1991 they submitted
a proposal for a European Convention for the Protection of Minorities.'O° The
convention is based on the CSCE's Copenhagen Document and the Charter of
Paris, and limits its scope to what is referred to as negative solutions or "internal
self-determination."' '
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe decided not to follow
the example of the European Commission of Democracy through Law in opting
for a separate convention to protect minorities. Instead, on February 1, 1993, the
Parliamentary Assembly adopted the draft of an Additional Protocol to the
European Convention of Human Rights on the rights of minorities." 9 The
adoption of Draft Protocol by the Parliamentary Assembly constitutes only a
recommendation. This Protocol will not enter into force and become legally
binding until it is adopted by at least a two-thirds majority of the Committee of
Ministers, is opened for signature, and is ratified by at least five states.
Furthermore, even if the Draft Protocol were to become legally binding, it
is not as beneficial to groups as it might first appear. Article 3 of the draft
provides that "every person belonging to a national minority may exercise his/her
rights and enjoy them individually or in association with others."'' 0 It has
been noted that "[tihis wording is important as it indicates that the Protocol
would not guarantee group rights.' Therefore, the benefit derived by groups
from the Protocol, if in fact it does come into force, is tenuous.
The Council of Europe has also been active in the area of minority
languages. On November 5, 1992, a European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages was opened for signature by the Member States of the Council of
Europe."l2 This charter contains far-reaching measures of positive state action
for promoting the use of regional and minority languages in the fields of
education and culture, in legal proceedings involving courts and administrative
authorities, by the media, and in economic and social life.
Most recently, the Heads of State of the Member States of the Council of
Europe issued a declaration concerning national minorities." 3 This declaration
pledged the leaders to implement the CSCE commitments regarding national
minorities, and to try and transform these political commitments into legal
obligations. It also instructed the Committee of Ministers to draft a framework
convention for the protection of national minorities, which would be open for
signature by non-member states, as well as begin work on a draft protocol to the
107. European Commission for Democracy through Law, Proposal for a European Convention for the
Protection of Minorities, Feb. 8, 1991, reprinted in 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 269 (1991) [hereinafter Proposal for
European Convention for the Protection of Minorities].
108. Giorgio Malinverni, The Draft Convention for the Protection of Minorities: The Proposal of the
European Commission for Democracy through Law, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 265, 266 (1991).
109. Draft Protocol on Minority Rights to the European Convention on Human Rights, Feb. 1, 1993,
reprinted in 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. 140 (1993) [hereinafter Draft Protocol].
110. Id. at 145.
111. Id. at 143 (Heinrich Klebes, Introduction).
112. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Nov. 5, 1992, reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. LJ.
148 (1993).
113. Summit Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the 32 Member States of the Council of
Europe, Nov. 30, 1993, reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. W. 375 (1993).
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ECHR for persons belonging to national minorities. It seems apparent that the
Heads of State want to combine the approach of the Proposal by the Commission
on Democracy through Law (a seperate convention)" 4 with the approach of the
Parliamentary Assembly (Draft Protocol)." 5
IV. IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES
International human rights law is based on consent. Therefore, the largest
problem regarding human rights in general, and group rights in particular,
is implementing and enforcing agreed-upon norms. It is one thing to have
a right in theory, but it is quite another to have methods to ensure that the
right is protected in practice. The evolution of human rights law begins
with the solidification of a normative basis, and eventually arrives at
methods of enforcement." 6  This section will examine the established
mechanisms for implementing and enforcing group rights.
A. The United Nations
The United Nations system does not provide for the judicial enforcement of
group rights. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the only world court,
and only states can be parties to the ICJ. " T Under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the only mandatory method of implementation is
the examination of state reports by the Human Rights Committee."' There are
two optional implementation mechanisms. One of these is an inter-state
complaint procedures. The other is included in the Convention's First Optional
Protocol, which grants the Committee the authority to hear petitions submitted
by individuals who have exhausted local remedies, provided they can effectively
demonstrate a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. 1 9
However, this procedure, like the inter-state complaint mechanism, is limited to
those states which are signatories to the Optional Protocol. The Committee's
mandate under this Protocol is to reach a decision on the merits, but not to issue
a judgment. In the one Optional Protocol case arising under Article 27, Lovelace
v. Canada, the Committee found that certain provisions of the Indian Act of
Canada violated Article 27, as they interfered with the complainant's cultural
rights by denying her the right to reside on an Indian reservation after marrying
a non-Indian. 2a Because of this violation, the Act had to be repealed.
114. Proposal for European Convention for the Protection of Minorities, supra note 107.
115. Draft Protocol, supra note 109.
116. Thomas Bergenthal, Taking Human Rights Seriously: New Customary International Law, Proceedings
of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (1993).
117. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, U.N. CHARTER ANNEX, art. 34. The ICJ, however,
left open the issue of whether groups could have standing. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J.
12, 22 (Oct. 16, 1975).
118. Political Rights Covenant, supra note 34, at art. 40.
119. Id. at art. 5.
120. Report of the Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee, Lovelace v. Canada,
Comm. No. 24/1977, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981). The Indian
Act of Canada codified the Indian custom that a woman loses her tribal status upon marriage to an outsider,
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Lovelace illustrates that the protection offered by Article 27 and implemented
through the Optional Protocol is relatively strong. However, this individual
petition procedure is not available for petitions concerning the violation of
collective rights.' A development which may be quite useful in protecting
group rights within the United Nations system is the establishment of a UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights. The effectiveness of this office waits to be
seen.
B. The CSCE
The implementation procedure within the CSCE is currently the most
advanced of any state-based system. The Vienna Concluding Document
established a four-stage process by which the states could be held accountable
for violations of CSCE provisions relating to the human dimension: (1) manda-
tory exchange of information requested by another Participating State; (2) the
holding of bilateral meetings with a participating State that so requests; (3)
bringing the matter to the attention of other participating States; and (4)
discussing the matter, including specific cases, at meetings of the Conference on
the Human Dimension as well as the main CSCE Follow-Up Meetings. 22
The Vienna Concluding Document provided for a thorough implementation
procedure, but this mechanism was hampered by unlimited application of the
principle of consensus, a central tenet of the CSCE. A meeting of the-
Conference on the Human Dimension was held in Moscow during September
and October, 1991 to discuss the implementation procedures. During the
meeting, delegates noted that previously-addressed human rights violations
persisted while new violations were erupting across Europe as a result of ethnic
and racial hatred. 123 Delegates sensed little interest or willingness by states to
address these conflicts despite the increase in ethnic tension. Many felt a new
approach was necessary.1
24
The new implementation procedure formulated during the Moscow Meeting,
termed the Moscow Mechanism, creates two paradigms. The first provides for
the invitation by a state of a CSCE mission, comprised of independent experts,
to address or contribute to the resolution of questions relating to the Human
and thus her right to live on the reservation.
121. See Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Comm. No. 167/1984, U.N. Doc. A145/40 vol. II, at 1 (1990).
The Committee refused to decide the case on its merits. Although individuals could join to claim violations
of their individual rights, they could not do so for collective rights.
122. Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 95, at 290.
123. See COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THE Moscow MEETING OF THE
CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
5 (1991).
124. See Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Oct.
3, 1991, reprinted in 12 HUM. RTs. L.J. 471, 472 (1991) [hereinafter Moscow Document]. The document
stated that the participating States particularly "deplored acts of discrimination, hostility and violence against
persons or groups on national, ethnic, or religious grounds." Id. Also, the participating States expressed that
"for the full realization of their commitments relating to the human dimension, continued efforts are still
required which should benefit substantially from the profound political changes that have occurred." Id.
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Dimension. 25 -The second paradigm, as documented in Paragraph 12, is an
emergency mechanism.'26 It authorizes a state, if it believes that "a particular-
ly serious threat to the fulfillment of the provisions of the CSCE Human
Dimension has arisen,""" to send a CSCE mission to another state. It may do
this even over that state's objection, as long as it has the support of at least nine
other states. This is an unprecedented deviation from the principle of consensus
and offers great possibilities for the protection of human rights. In fact,
Paragraph 37 states that the emergency mechanism is of particular relevance for
the prevention and resolution of minority conflicts.!28
While in all probability the Moscow Mechanism will be of great benefit to
minorities, it must be remembered that the CSCE provisions are not binding
legal obligations. Nevertheless, many of the rights provided in CSCE documents
are also listed in United Nations documents, and are thus binding obligations on
states. However, it is the supervisory procedures which create innovative
solutions to group problems, and it is just these implementation procedures
which would not be enforceable.
An additional mechanism created by the CSCE was the establishment of a
High Commissioner on National Minorities at the Helsinki Follow-Up meeting
in 1992.29 The purpose of the High Commissioner is to provide early warning
and, where appropriate, to take "early action" to defuse minority issues that
threaten to develop into conflict. 3  The first High Commissioner, Max van
der Stoel, has been active since he took office on January 1, 1993. He has sent
missions to examine the positions of minorities in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Slovakia,
Hungary, the Ukraine, and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan.131 Although the general approach is. innovative, the effectiveness
of the High Commissioner's position is stymied by the fact that his mandate
excludes consideration of any existing dispute. Additionally, the mandate
explicitly prevents the High Commissioner from communicating with any person
or organization which practices or publicly condones terrorism or violence. 32
Therefore, those groups that have felt compelled to resort to violence as a result
of governmental repressions are not even qualified to communicate with the High
125. Id. at 472.
126. Id. at 473.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 476.
129. Document of the Helsinki Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, July
10, 1992, reprinted in 13 HuM. RTs. L.J. 284, 289 (1992) [hereinafter Helsinki Document].
130. Edward Mortimer, Alternative to Violence, FIN. TimS, June 24, 1992. at 19.
131. For. descriptions of these missions, see CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
Bulletin, Autumn 1993 - Spring/Summer 1994.
132. Helsinki Document, supra note 129, at 291.
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Commissioner. This severely limits his access to important sources of information.
C. The Council of Europe
Within the European arena there are two primary implementation and
enforcement mechanisms for the European Convention of Human Rights.'
The first is the European Commission of Human Rights which, along with the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, supervises the enforcement of
rights guaranteed by the Convention. l" There is a mandatory inter-state
complaint mechanism and an Optional Protocol for individual complaints, which
all signatories have accepted.'35 These mechanisms are similar to those within
the United Nations for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and thus share many of the same deficiencies.
The second mechanism is the European Court of Human Rights. Under the
Convention, only states and the Commission can refer complaints to this court.
Neither individuals or groups have standing.'36 This was remedied somewhat
in the case of individuals by entry into force of the Ninth Additional Protocol in
November 1994, which empowers the individual to refer a case to the Court if
the Commission rules it admissible.'37 An ancillary implementation procedure
provided under the Convention is the authorization of the Secretary-General of
the Council of Europe to request an explanation concerning a particular issue
from any state, including information concerning a specific case.'
Implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages involves the examination of state reports by an independent
committee of experts, similar to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 39  The Proposal for a European Convention for the Protection of
Minorities authorizes the establishment of a European Committee for the
Protection of Minorities." This Committee would supervise the Convention's
mandatory reporting system as well as the optional state and individual petition
procedures. This proposed Convention, like the draft convention noted above,
relies on the same kind of enforcement mechanisms included in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Thus, it also suffers from the same
inherent deficiencies.
V. VIOLATIONS OF MINORITY RIGHTS: A CASE STUDY
Although minorities are guaranteed numerous rights, these rights are rarely
provided. Governments often fear that respecting these rights will encourage
133. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 90.
134. Id. at art. 19.
135. Id. at art. 25.
136. Id. at art. 19.
137. Protocol No. 9 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 6, 1990, reprinted in 12 HuM. RTs. L.J. 51 (1991) [hereinafter Protocol No. 9].
138. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 90.
139. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, supra note 112; Political Rights Covenant,
supra note 34.
140. Proposal for European Convention for the Protection of Minorities, supra note 107.
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separatist. movements and lead to the dissolution of the states. Thus, they'often
violate the rights of these groups.
Current implementation and enforcement procedures are ineffective in
protecting the rights of groups. The primary problem is that only states, and not
minority groups themselves, can call attention to violations of minority rights.
Thus, the political maneuvering that surrounds the protection of minorities
overwhelms and obstructs effective enforcement at the state level. This lack of
effective enforcement in turn leads to increased violence and political instability.
The need for new mechanisms to protect group rights and provide for early
warning of conflicts is illustrated by the experience of the Kurdish People.-
A. The Kurdish People
The Kurds are homeless even at home, and stateless abroad. Their ancient woes
are locked inside an obscure language. They have powerful, impatient enemies and
a few rather easily bored friends. Their traditional society is considered a nuisance
at worst and a curiosity at best. For them the act of survival, even identity itself,
is a kind of victory. 4'
The area inhabited by the Kurds, known as Kurdistan since the thirteenth
century, is rich in natural resources. It has been called the "heart of the region,"
because almost the entire water supply for the Middle East passes through this
area. Oil, the principle commodity, is found in commercial quantities in Kirkuk
and Khanaqin in Iraq, Batman and Silvan- in Turkey, and at Rumeylan in
Syria.'42 These areas are part of historical Kurdistan.
The Kurdish population is estimated between 20 and 25 million people,
which makes them one of the largest nations in the world today to have been
denied an independent state.'43 The majority of Kurds live in their traditional
homeland in the mountainous region connecting Iran, Iraq and Turkey, although
smaller Kurdish communities exist in Syria, Armenia and Azerbaijan. A rough
estimate places 10 to 11 million Kurds in Turkey (19% of the population); 5 to
6 million in Iran (10% of the population); 4 to 4.5 million in Iraq (23% of the
population); 1 million in Syria; and 70,000 to 80,000 in Armenia and Azer-
bijan.'" .
. The origin of the Kurdish people is uncertain. They believe themselves to
be descended form the Medes, although modem scholarship disputes this
theory.' 45 It is unlikely that the Kurds are aboriginal or derive from a single
source. Furthermore, religion plays no role in the Kurdish identity since there is
no single religion. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslim, although some practice the
rival Shi'i faith, and others practice one of several indigenous religions."
Despite the different faiths, loyalty to religious leaders remains a tenet of
141. Christopher Hitchens, The Struggle of the Kurds, 182 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIc 32, 60 (Aug. 1992).
142. David McDowall, The Kurds, in MINORITY RIGHrs GROUP REPORT 8 (1991).
143. Id. at 9.
144. Numbers and population breakdowns are comprised from Robert Olson, The Kurdish Question in the
Aftermath of the Gulf War: Geopolitical and Geostrategic Changes in the Middle East, 13 THIRD WORLD Q.
475 (1992); DAVID McDowALL, THE KURDS: A NATION DENIED 12 (Minority Rights Group ed., 1992).
145. MCDOWALL, supra note 144, at 11.
146. Id. at 13.
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Kurdish society. The Kurdish language is divided into multiple dialects, the
most predominant of which are Kurmanji, spoken in northern Iraq, eastern
Turkey, and Azerbaijan; and Zaza, spoken in western Turkey.'47 Despite these
internal differences, Kurdish society developed a distinctive culture which has
survived over 2,000 years. The Kurds believe themselves to be a distinct people
and have established their own sense of identity. ' s
Kurds are historically a nomadic and semi-nomadic people, and their society
reflects this lifestyle. Loyalty belongs first to the family and then to the
tribe. 149 Despite the modem decline of the tribe, tribal values are still very
much ingrained. Historically, tribes formed confederations, although individual
loyalty was determined predominantly by blood ties and territorial associa-
tion. 50 Despite the fostering of tribal confederations by states, which encour-
aged confederations as a means of border protection, political power tended to
reside in the agahs, or local chiefs. The power of confederate chiefs was
dependent both on governmental recognition and on the willingness of local
chiefs to obey their commands.'
Mountain Kurds vary greatly from those living on the plains and in the
foothills. The plains society is much more sedentary, and the rural peasantry
developed ties to the landlords rather than agahs. A shift in land registration,
however, soon aligned the interests of the agahs with the landlords, and
encouraged both in participation with the state.'52 The state began a process
of detribalizing land, so that land which had previously belonged to the entire
tribe suddenly became the absolute property of a single individual. As such,
tribal members became a landless cultivator class.' This process was
accelerated by the solidification of international boundaries following 1920,
which destroyed the nomadic pattern of many tribes."5 The decline of
traditional Kurdish tribalism was exacerbated by the advent of mechanized
farming, which increased the migration of young Kurds to urban centers and
resulted in the creation of an urban proletariat.'55
B. The History of the Kurds
Early relations between the Kurds and governmental authorities were based
on trade. Successive governments in the medieval period recognized the semi-
autonomous state of the Kurdish agahs 56 As a result of conflicts between the
Ottoman and Persian Safavid Empires in the fifteenth century, the Kurds were
147. Hitchens, supra note 141, at 58.
148. McDowall, supra note 142, at 9.
149. Id. at 11.
150. Id.




155. Id. at 13.
156. See MCDOWALL, supra note 144, at 26.
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promised their own fiefdoms and principalities in exchange for guarding their
mutual border.151
The independent principalities remained in place until the early nineteenth
century when direct Ottoman administration was extended into Kurdistan. The
destruction of the Kurdish principalities resulted in increased rivalry among
agahs, which allowed the religious leaders, known as shaikhs, to gain consider-
able power. The Kurds revolted against Ottoman control periodically throughout
the nineteenth century, and although these revolts had wide support, they were
unsuccessful." 8
Despite their displeasure with Ottoman authority, Kurdish agahs neverthe-
less recognized certain shared interests with the Ottomans. The Kurds, in
comparison with other minorities living within the Ottoman empire, were in a
privileged position because of their shared religious beliefs. As such, they were
willing to participate in the. persecution of others in an attempt to protect their
own privileged status. 59 An extreme example of this is the assistance of
Kurdish leaders in the Armenian massacres of 1895-96. These massacres contin-
ued throughout World War I, when many Kurds served as Ottoman soldiers.
Despite their complicity, the Ottoman authorities soon began to persecute the
Kurds for fear that they would collaborate with their Russian enemies."
The decline of the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by the growth of
nationalist sentiment in many minority populations living within its borders,
including the Kurds. When the Ottoman Empire surrendered at the end of World
War I, this burgeoning nationalism found Allied support during negotiations on
the distribution of the conquered territory. 61  Point Twelve of President
Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Point Program for World Peace stated that non-
Turkish minorities of the; former Ottoman Empire should be "assured of an
absolute unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.' 62  The result
of the Allies' deliberations was the 1920 Treaty of S~vres, which provided for
interim autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish area of Turkey and, ultimately,
full independence. 63
157. Id. at 27.
158. Id. at 27-29.
159. Id. at 30.
160. Id. at 30-31.
161. Id. at 32.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 33. The relevant portions of the Treaty of SRvres state:
Article 62: [A commission composed of Allied appointees would] prepare for local autonomy in
those regions where the Kurdish element is preponderant lying east of the Euphrates, to the south of
the still-to-be established Armenian frontier and to the north of the frontier between Turkey, Syria
and Mesopotamia.
Article 64: If, after one year has elapsed since the implementation of the present treaty, the Kurdish
population of the areas designated in Article 62 calls on the Council of the League of Nations and
demonstrates that a majority of the population in these areas wishes to become independent of
Turkey, and if the Council then estimates that the population in question is capable of such
independence and recommends that it be granted, then Turkey agrees, as of now, to comply with this
recommendation and to renounce all rights and titles to the area .... If and when the said
renunciation is made, no objection shall be raised by the main Allied powers should the Kurds living
in the part of Kurdistan at present included in the vilayet of Mosul seek to become citizens of the
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. There were several geopolitical reasons for the Allies' desire for an
independent Kurdish state. The primary reason was to place a buffer between
the Turks of Anatolia and the Turkish-speaking people of Central Asia,
especially those in the Caucasus. A second reason was to create a buffer state
between Turkey, with its emergent nationalism, and the autonomous republic of
Azerbaijan in the USSR. A third reason was to create a similar buffer between
Turkey and the Azeri population in Iran. The Sunnism of the Kurdish state
would distinguish it from the Shi'ism of both Azerbijans. Finally, from the
Allies' perspective, an independent Kurdish state would reduce the potential
power of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and allow them to utilize the Kurdish state and the
Kurdish population against these governments whenever they deemed it in their
best interest.164
Unfortunately for the Kurds, the Treaty of S~vres was never implemented.
The Turkish government which had signed the treaty was replaced by one led
by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), who repudiated the Treaty after his victory against
Christian forces. 65 The Allies found themselves in the position of having to
renegotiate the settlement of the remnants of a vanquished empire with a new
ruler. For the most part, the Allies' essential interests had not been effected, and
they were not prepared to renegotiate on behalf of the Armenians or the Kurds.
They realized that it would require military action to implement the relevant
aspects of the Treaty of Sbvres, and this was more than they were willing to
undertake.'" In addition, the geopolitical advantages of an independent
Kurdish state were no longer as appealing, as a strong Turkish state could stymie
the spread of Bolshevism.'
67
The Lausanne Treaty in 1923 reestablished Turkish sovereignty over eastern
Thrace and Anatolia. '6 The Lausanne Treaty did provide some protection for
"non-Muslim minorities;"'" however, the Turkish government subsequently
denied the applicability of these provisions to the Kurds.' 70 Kurdish and
Armenian rights recognized in the Treaty of S6vres were ignored, and the
remaining Kurdish territory was divided between Iran and Iraq. The Allies had
abandoned the Kurdish cause. The Kurds had ultimately fallen victim to the
great power politics of the United Kingdom and the USSR, both of which
thought it was in their interests to cooperate with the increasingly strong states
of Turkey and Iran. Thus, they acquiesced in Turkey's and Iran's suppression
of Kurdish nationalist movements.1
7
'
newly independent Kurdish state.
Id. (quoting Treaty of Svres, arts. 62, 64 (signed Aug. 20, 1920)).
164. See Olson, supra note 144, at 479.
165. MCDOWALL, supra note 144, at 34-35.
166. Id. at 35.
167. Id. at 35-36.
168. Treaty of Peace, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11 (1924).
169. McDowall, supra note 142, at 16.
170. Id. at 17.
171. Olson, supra note 144, at 475.
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C. The Kurds in Turkey
Ataturk's interest following the defeat of the Christian Armenians was the
creation of a secular, Turkish nation-state. Despite official statements of
recognition of the "national and social rights of the Kurds,"'72  Ataturk
abolished the Sultanate in 1922 and the Caliphate in 1924; along with them
crumbled the traditional order of the agahs and shaikhs.173 With the abolish-
ment of the Caliphate, the government crushed all public vestiges of separate
Kurdish identity. Kurdish schools, associations, publications, religious
fraternities and teaching foundations were all banned.' 74  The threat to
traditional Kurdish society and identity served to unify different segments of the
population, including urban intellectuals, agahs and shaikhs.
The first widespread revolt occurred in 1925 under the leadership of
Naqshbandi, Sheikh Said of Prian, although it was quickly suppressed by Turkish
forces.' Almost immediately another revolt was initiated, coordinated by a
new Kurdish liberation organization which arranged the support of leading
Kurdish groups and was financed by the Shah of Iran. The Kurds gained a
considerable amount of territory, but with the withdrawal of Iranian support the
revolt faltered. 1
76
The persecution of the Kurds continued. Law No. 1850 legalized
"[m]urders and other actions committed individually or collectively, from the
20th of June 1930 to the 10th of December 1930, ... during the pursuit and
extermination of the revolts" in the Kurdish areas.' The government also
used mass deportations and population transfers to quell Kurdish unrest; over one
million Kurds were forcibly relocated between 1925 and 1938.171 Kurdish
villages were closely policed, use of the Kurdish language, dress, and names
were prohibited, and martial law was imposed on Kurdish areas, remaining in
place until 1946.17
In 1950, the first free elections in Turkey were held and the Democratic
Party gained power. In return for strong Kurdish electoral support, the
Democratic Party eased Kurdish repression. Some exiled agahs and shaikhs
were allowed to return and had their property reinstated, some Kurds Were
elected to Parliament, and schools, roads, and hospitals were built in Kurdish
regions.1°  In 1961 a new constitution was adopted, which allowed for
freedom of expression, press, and association."' These liberalizations allowed
for the expression of Kurdish dissent; Kurds scattered throughout the state began
to organize. In 1965, the separatist Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was
172. McDowall, supra note 142, at 16 (quoting Kendal in Chaliand, C., People Without A Country).
173. Id. at 16.
174. MCDOWALL, supra note 144, at 36.
175. 1l.
176. Id. at 37.
177. Id. at 38.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 39.
181. Id.
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established, and worked in conjunction with Kurdish resistance movements in
Iraq.
82
As Kurdish and leftist groups gained popularity, the government increased
its efforts to silence "objectionable" cultural and political activity. Many of the
bilingual Kurdish-Turkish journals that had appeared in the mid 1960s were
banned, and in 1967 special commando forces were organized to patrol Kurdish
villages and intimidate the local population. In 1971, the army overthrew the
Demirel government and Kurdish political parties were banned." 3 Throughout
the 1970s there was sporadic oppression of the Kurds and martial law was again
imposed on Kurdish areas in 1979. Another coup occurred in 1980, and tens of
thousands of leftists and Kurds were arrested, interrogated, and tortured.1 4 In
1982, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden filed a complaint
with the European Commission of Human Rights alleging widespread human
rights violations in Turkey, although without explicit reference to the Kurds." 5
. Much of the Kurdish region effectively became a militarized zone. The
government justified the military's presence by citing the proximity to the Soviet
Union, but the actual purpose was to suppress growing Kurdish nationalism. As
the Turkish President declared, "there is no room for liberated regions and
activities aimed at language, race, class or sectarian differences in our homeland.
The government will defeat the disease and heads will be crushed."' 86
The restoration of civilian authority in 1984 did little to alleviate the tension
between Turkish authorities and the Kurds. The civilian government upheld the
1982 Constitution which prohibits activities which violate "the indivisible
integrity of the State with its territory and nation," and specifically prohibits
parliament from pardoning prisoners charged with this offense.8 7 In addition,
it was illegal for political parties to concern themselves with the diffusion of any
non-Turkish language or culture, or seek to foster minorities. In fact, until
recently, the government refused to acknowledge the existence of the Kurds,
calling them instead "mountain Turks."
In response to this continual repression, Kurdish resistance took on a
militant quality. In the late 1970's the radical Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK)
was formed by Abdullah Ocalan. 88 The goal of the PKK was the creation of
an independent socialist Kurdish state, and it used guerilla tactics to accomplish
this aim. The PKK found its greatest support in the south-eastern provinces of
Turkey, that stretch along its 200 mile border with Iraq. "'89
Currently, the PKK is headquartered in Damascus, Syria, and receives aid
from Kurdish organizations and the Syrian government. Syrian support for the
PKK seems to stem mainly from Turkey's reduction of water flowing from the
182. Id. at 40.
183. Id
184. Id. at 43.
185. Applications No. 9940-9944/82. The applications were declared admissible by the Commission on
Dec. 6, 1983, but a "friendly settlement" was reached so only a pro forma report was adopted by the
Commission.
186. MCDOWALL, supra note 144, at 43.
187. HANNUM, supra note 15, at 188-89.
188. MCDOWALL, supra note 144, at 44.
189. Id.
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Euphrates river, a major source of water, running through both Syria and Turkey.
Syria hoped to use its support for the PKK as leverage against Turkey's
reduction of water released into the Euphrates by up-river dams.' 9
From 1983 until Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Turkey and Iraq
cooperated closely to contain their respective Kurdish populations and Kurdish
nationalism. In 1984, Turkey and Iraq agreed to establish a joint six-mile-wide
security zone along their border, and Turkish forces made repeated incursions
into Iraq to attack Kurdish guerilla bases.' 91 During the 1980s, in addition to
its traditional concerns about Kurdish nationalism, Turkey sought to reduce
Kurdish threats to its $50 billion Southern Anatolia Project (GAP), the
hydroelectric dam and irrigation scheme for southeastern Turkey, which is
located in the heart of Turkish Kurdistan. Turkey and Iraq were also concerned
about Kurdish threats to the oil pipelines running from Iraq to the Mediterranean,
through Kurdish territory. Iraq's interest in protecting the oil pipeline stemmed
from its dependence on oil exportation through Turkey after the outbreak of its
war with Iran.1
92
One ramification of these nationalist and geopolitical concerns was that the
Turkish campaign against the PKK and the Kurdish identity intensified. Turkey
is not a party to any of the major human rights conventions, except the European
Convention on Human Rights; thus there has been little opportunity for the
international community to comment on Turkey's treatment of its Kurds.
Nevertheless, the international community is aware of the violation of the
Turkish Kurds human rights.
This campaign against the Kurdish identity has resulted in a systematic
denial of their ethnicity and the violation of their group rights. The United
States, a political ally of Turkey and thus not apt to criticize the government,
noted in 1986:
the [Turkish] Government remains adamantly opposed to any assertion of a Kurdish
ethnic identity and has taken a number of steps to suppress it. Publication of
books, newspapers, and any other materials in Kurdish is forbidden, as are books
or any other materials in Turkish dealing with Kurdish history, culture or ethnic
identity. Use of the Kurdish language is not permitted for any official purposes,
e.g., in the courts, nor is it allowed in certain private situations, such as receiving
visitors in prison.1
93
In 1990, the government passed decree No. 413, which gave the regional
governor of ten southeastern provinces broad powers to censor the press and to
exile from the region people who present a danger to law and order.
194
The Turkish government has continually denied the existence of the Kurdish
identity. A high government official reportedly stated, "We have no ethnic
minorities," and in May 1990, the head of the Human Rights Department of the
Foreign Ministry asserted that Kurds are not a minority because only religious
190. See Olson, supra note 144, at 477.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 478.
193. U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 1986, at 1051.
194. See HELSINKI WATCH, DEsTRoYING ETHNIc IDENTITY: THE KuRDs OF TURKEY, AN UPDATE 13
(1990).
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minorities are recognized by the Lausanne Treaty. 95 She also stated there was
no discrimination against the Kurds, but that such discrimination would develop
if Kurds insisted upon a separate language and a separate culture.' 96  The
Minister of Finance supported his colleague, agreeing that there was no
discrimination against the Kurds, and asserting that special Kurdish schools
would create segregation and give rise to ethnic conflicts. 7
The Kurds are outraged by the denial of their ethnic identity. Repeatedly,
they have expressed their desire to "speak Kurdish officially, to read Kurdish
books, to sing Kurdish songs, to dance Kurdish dances, to celebrate Kurdish
holidays, and to give their children Kurdish names."' 8 "We want the govern-
ment to accept us as Kurds," one citizen said, "and to leave us alone. We just
want to be Kurds."' 99
In 1993, a shift seemed to have occurred when Prime Minister Demirel
stated, "I do recognize the Kurdish reality .... [A]ny citizen who calls himself
a Kurd cannot be forced to call himself a Turk, ... the pressure previously
applied has been wrong ... . A citizen who calls himself a Kurd is equal to a
citizen who calls himself a Turk and has equal rights."2t" He expressly granted
the Kurds the right to use the Kurdish language in public.
This apparent shift, however, seems to be predominantly rhetorical.
Beginning with the inauguration of Demirel as Prime Minister in November
1991, the campaign against the PKK intensified. This conflict with the PKK has
resulted in the loss of 2,000 lives in 1992, for an estimated total of 7,400.20'
Many were civilian casualties. The Helsinki Watch noted that the attacks on
civilians were part of a systematic pattern of violence: "PKK guerrillas attack
military forces in a town ... [and] security forces then retaliate against the
civilian population with such ferocity that homes and shops are destroyed and
inhabitants forced to flee."'  There was also reportedly a plan to instigate
forced birth control in southeastern Turkey, in violation of the Genocide
Convention.0 3
Initially, Kurdish support for the PKK within Turkey was divided, but it
was consolidated, however, as a result of the killings, harassment, and abuse of
Kurds by the security forces. Tactics used by the Turkish government appear to
have been counterproductive, driving more and more civilians into the arms of
the PKK. 2°'4 With the growth of domestic PKK support came a decline in
international assistance. Iraqi Kurds, dependent on Turkey for their survival,
helped Turkey drive the PKK from its territory. Syria shut PKK bases in
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2.
198. Id
199. Id.
200. Alistair Lyon, War-Weary Turks, Kurds See Change for Peace, Reuters, Mar. 23, 1993.
201. Turkey: Human Rights Group Says Abuses Against Kurds Have Risen, Inter Press Services, Mar. 18,
1993. See also, Alan Cowell, For Turkey and Kurds, 'Total Warfare,' INT'L HERALD. TRIB., Oct. 19, 1993,
at 1.
202. Id.
203. KURDISTAN NEWS, (International Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan) No. 4, Mar. 19, 1993.
204. HELSINIU WATCH, supra note 194, at 1.
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Lebanon. Turkey's Western allies denounced the PKK, while quietly urging
Ankara to end human rights abuses against Kurds. °5 In response, Ocalan set
the PKK on a new course. In March 1993, he called for an end to the fighting,
denounced intentions to secede, and called for greater political and cultural
freedoms.
Many Kurds fear that the Turkish government would not keep its promises
of progress towards democracy and respect for human rights once the guerilla
struggle ceases. This sentiment was voiced by one Kurdish leader: "Since the
1830s, all Kurdish revolts were followed by promises which were not kept ....
The Kurdish people have been jailed, abused and cheated. There is distrust but
there is also hope. ',21 As it turns out, the skepticism of Turkish Kurds
proved warranted. Due to continued governmental repression in the form of air
strikes and infantry advances, the PKK cease-fire was called-off in May 1993
with an attack in which 33 Turkish soldiers were killed. The government
responded with a policy of "total warfare" in which 1,600 people died within
five months, in what the parties conceed is an "accelerating spiral of vio-
lence.20
In an attempt to call attention to the renewed conflict and harm Turkey's
lucerative tourist industry, which the Kurds assert helps to fund military
operations in the Southeast, the PKK kidnapped and released 26 foreigners
traveling in Turkey and engaged in attacks on Turkish properties in Europe in
June and November 1993. 208 After the second such attack Turkish Prime
Minister Tansu Ciller stated her determination to crush a Kurdish "terrorist
plague" by sending specially trained commandos to the southeast region of the
country to "fight the militants with their own methods."' Since then, there
have been systematic attacks on alleged PKK strongholds, including the razing
of villages believed to harbor PKK activists.210 In addition, Mrs. Ciller's
government jailed seven parlimentary representatives of the legal Kurdish party
for "advocating and promoting terrorism," thereby effectively suppressing the
main outlet for Kurdish aspirations, short of terror.2 '
Protests have continued across Europe, particularly in Germany where an
estimated 400,000 Kurds live, resulting in repeated violent clashes between
German police and Kurdish demonstrators 2 3, including death by self-
immolation of two Kurdish women to protest "Bonn's support for Turkish
suppression of [their] people. 214
205. Lyon, supra note 200.
206. Id. Statement of Mehdi Zana, a former mayor of Diyarbakir, capital of the southeastern province, who
spent many years in jail for his nationalist views.
207. Cowell, supra note 201 at 1.
208. Id. at 5; see also, Terrorist Target: Tourists OffBeaten Path, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 2, 1994,
at 1.
209. Barry James, Turkish Targets in Europe Are Hit Again, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 5, 1993, at 1.
210. Turkey Bombs Kurdish Stronghold, INT'L HERALD TRtB., Sept. 24-25, 1994, at 2.
211. Turks, Kurds and Allies, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 28, 1994, at 1.
212. James, supra note 209, at 4.
213. Militant Kurds Stage Violent German Protests, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1994.
214. 2d Kurdish Woman Dies in Germany, INT'L HERALD TRtB., Mar. 25, 1994, at 2.
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Although the U.S. and other Western allies assert in private that political
concessions must be made, they do not insist on this point with the Turkish
government, which they arm.2 5 A primary reason for this lack of insisitance
is that Turkey is a member of NATO and plays a crucial role in Western efforts
to maintain economic and military pressure on President Saddam Hussein of
Iraq. That is "a higher priority for the United States than the Kurdish insurgen-
cy. '  As such, despite the increasing escalation of the conflict and the
continued denial of Kurdish identity, the international community is not prepared
to jepordize relations with Turkey in order to protect Kurdish rights.
As it turns out, Turkish Kurds were correct in doubting the sincerity of the
government's promises to protect Kurdish rights: in 1994, the government once
again stepped up the campaign against Turkish Kurds, targeting those villages
which they believe to be PKK strongholds.2 t
D. The Kurds in Iraq
Modern Iraq emerged from the Ottoman province of Mesopotamia as a
result of British conquest, and in 1920 Iraq fell under British control. Great
Britain intended to create an Arab state with one or more semi-autonomous
Kurdish provinces. Although the League of Nations Commission concluded that
"if the ethnic argument alone had to be taken into account, the necessary
conclusion would be that an independent Kurdish State should be created, since
the Kurds form five-eighths of the population," the British wanted a unified state
in order to ensure the state's economic viability and their access to the oil fields
in Mosul.2"'
Acting in a supervisory capacity, Great Britain instigated a policy of direct
administration through Kurdish officials, and recognized Kurdish culture,
language and customs. In fact, the only exception to the general suppression of
the Kurds between World War I and World War II was in Iraq, and occurred as
a result of these British policies. These policies are the reasons why the Iraqi
Kurds today have greater cultural autonomy than those in either Turkey or
Iran.21
9
British policy was to encourage Kurdish nationalism, but not independence.
The British resisted an independent Kurdish state for several reasons.
Economically, it was important to keep the area unified to ensure its viability,
and politically, the British wanted the capability to use the Kurdish population
as a balance against the Sunni Arabs. The intent was to use the threat of
Kurdish nationalism to force the governments of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran to accept
British policies throughout the Middle East.22 In addition, the British believed
the Kurds to be well-cared-for, as the Iraqi Government had promised to respect
the League of Nations' recommendations that the Kurds be allowed to use their
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own language, and that Kurds should comprise the administration of the
region.221 Despite the exclusion of these provisions in the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi
Treaty, the British felt confident in this arrangement, and thus Iraq effectively
became an independent state in 1932.22
Almost immediately, the Kurds initiated a revolt demanding an independent
Kurdish state. The separatist revolt was eventually led by Mulla Mustafa
Barzani, a secular.and religious leader whose name was "destined to become
almost synonymous with Kurdish revolt until his death in 1979. ",223 By 1945,
Barzani was active in the illegal Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and was the
effective ruler of a wide .area. However, after repelling repeated government
attacks, he was pushed across the border into Iran. He remained in exile until
the 1958 revolution led by General Qasim.224
The Iraqi Republic was established in 1958. It recognized the rights of both
Arabs and Kurds and legalized the KDP.2' Barzani tried to fulfill Kurdish
expectations generated by the new Constitution by demanding a substantial
degree of autonomy for the Kurdish region. Although Qasim had gone further
than any other regime in recognizing Kurdish rights, he was not prepared to
acquiesce to Barzani's demands, and armed struggle resumed.226 Meanwhile,
Iraq's neighbors used the war to their own advantage. Turkey, long hostile to
Qasim, allowed Iraqi Kurds to move through Turkish territory, and Iran provided
active support. However, both states conditioned their support on Barzani's
agreement not to export separatism to their own Kurdish populations.
227
Barzani and the Iraqi government eventually drafted a twelve-point program in
1966 which met many of the Kurd's demands, but the government fell before the
agreement could be implemented.228
In 1968 the Ba'ath regime led a successful coup. Settlement of the Kurdish
question was a priority; despite mutual antagonism, a ceasefire and peace
agreement between Barzani and the Ba'ath regime was arranged in 1970.229
The agreement provided for:
(1) Participation of Kurds in government ... ; (2) Recognition of Kurdish in those
areas where Kurds constitute themajority ... ; (3) Furtherance of Kurdish education
and culture; (4) Requirement that officials in the Kurdish areas speak Kurdish; (5)
Right to establish Kurdish student, youth, womens' and teachers' organizations; (6)
Economic development of the Kurdish area; (7) Return of Kurds to their villages
or financial compensation; (8) Agrarian reform; (9) Amendment of the Constitution
to read: 'the Iraqi people consist of two main nationalities'; ... (11) Appointment
of a Kurdish vice-president; ... (13) Formation of a Kurdish area with self-govern-
ment.2 °
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Although a number of clauses were actually implemented, including the
amendment to the Constitution, the agreement eventually disintegrated. Conflicts
soon developed over the boundaries of the Kurdish Autonomous Region and on
the issue of nationalization of the Kirkuk oil fields. Additionally, the Kurds
were once again manipulated by the interests of the global powers: Iran, the
United States, and Israel encouraged Barzani in an attempt to revive the conflict
and weaken the Iraqi government, and simultaneously, the Soviet Union made
an agreement with the Iraqi government to decrease support for Barzani.23" '
The Iraqi government promulgated Act No. 33 without the consent of the
Barzani leadership, in March 1974.232 The Act provided for Kurdish autono-
my, but limited it by the "legal, political, and economic unity of the Republic of
Iraq. 233 It also provided that while Kurdish was the official language of the
region along with Arabic, Arabic was the official language of correspondence
between the government of the Kurdish region and central authorities. 2M The
rights of non-Kurdish minorities in the region were also guaranteed, including
proportional representation in all local autonomous institutions.23 5
The most contentious part of the Act established the boundaries of the
Kurdish Autonomous Region to include only those areas with a majority Kurdish
population according to the 1957 census, which excluded the oil-rich city of
Kirkuk. 6  The other troublesome provision established what the Kurdish
leadership considered a "puppet" Legislative Assembly and Council with limited
powers for the region. 237 The Barzani-led leadership of the KDP denounced
the Act and charged the central government with reneging on the 1970
Agreement. Armed conflict soon erupted.238
The Kurds, with assistance from the Iranian government, were initially quite
successful. With the conclusion of the Algiers Agreement between Iran and Iraq,
in which Iran agreed to end support for the Iraqi Kurds in exchange for territorial
concessions, the Kurdish resistance collapsed. 9 Within a few months, the
Iraqi government controlled more Kurdish areas than at any time since 1961.
Barzani fled to the United States where he died in 1979, and the KDP split into
various factions. A new Kurdish party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
came into existence and began a guerilla campaign against the Iraqi govern-
ment.24o
In the years that followed, the Ba'ath regime began aggressively Arabizing
the Kurdish region through mass "relocations" of entire Kurdish villages and
severe repression of the Kurdish leadership. An estimated 800 Kurdish villages
along Iraq's borders with Turkey and Iran were razed to create a "security belt"
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between Iraqi Kurds and the Kurds in those states.24' Approximately 250,000
Kurds were "resettled" in southern and central Iraq, where they were distributed
among Arab villages in groups of up to five families.242
In 1980, the Kurds and the Iraqi government reached a new accord,
providing for the Autonomous Region to be governed according to the terms of
the 1970 Autonomy Agreement and the Autonomy Act No. 33.243 A twelve-
member Executive Council and a fifty-member Legislative Assembly were
convened to govern the region. Although the Legislative Assembly was
popularly elected, potential candidates had to be approved by the Iraqi
government. It had limited authority to enact legislation relating to the
development of "culture and nationalist customs of the Kurds," as well as other
local matters.2' Two elections were held, but despite the "institutional facade
real authority was tightly controlled by the central government, particularly
in the area of security affairs.
In early 1988, the Iraqi government embarked on the Anfal campaign to
eliminate the Kurds after Kurdish guerillas (Peshmegra) provided military
support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. The government began a series of
brutal reprisals against the Kurdish population. Thousands of Kurdish villages
were razed, and Iraqi forces engaged in the mass murder of civilians. 21 It is
estimated that one-third of the population of Iraqi Kurdistan was depopulat-
ed. 247
The most horrendous aspect of the reprisal campaign was the use of
chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians, most notably the 1988 chemical
attacks against Halabja, in which 5,000 civilians died.2' A Western journalist
who reached Halabja soon after the attack reported that "[b]odies lay heaped up,
ready for mass burial. Others lay where they had fallen when the bombs fell.
Halabja stank of death and of one of the nastier forms of destruction. Saddam
Hussein had responded in characteristic fashion to the Kurdish demand for an
acknowledged political identity."' 9 In 1991, the United Nations appointed a
Special Rapporteur on Iraq, who concluded that people with oppositional views
and minorities were persecuted with "cruel severity," including "genocide-like
activities," and that the atrocities committed by Saddam's regime were "so grave
and ... of such a massive nature that since the Second World War few parallels
can be found."'
After examining documents provided by the Iraqi government and accounts
given by refugees, the Special Rapporteur concluded that the Anfal campaign
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was, "like most actions of the Government of Iraq, very well planned,
implemented and documented." "' He determined that the immediate effects
of the Anfal campaign were to cause:
(a) the death of thousands of men, women and children by arbitrary execution or
indiscriminate killing; (b) the disappearance of tens of thousands of more men,
women and children; (c) the arbitrary arrest, detention, and forced relocation of
hundreds of thousands of men women and children; (d) the destruction of thousands
of villages including essential economic resources and important cultural properties;
and (e) the essential destruction of the rurally based Kurdish way of life. "
He concludes that these effects were accomplished in a systematic fashion
through "the intentional use of obviously excessive force.2"
It is important to note that these actions were aimed against all Kurds with
the object of eliminating real or presumed opposition." Since the events of
the Anfal campaign effected virtually every Iraqi Kurd, "genuine reconciliation
will be difficult as long as the issues and effects of the Anfal campaign remain
unresolved." In addition, although the Anfal officially ended in September
of 1988, many of the individual decrees and instructions issued in order to
implement the campaign remained in force for years to come, and some may still
be in force today.256
The events following the Gulf War clearly- illustrate the international
community's ambivalence toward minority protections and the political
maneuvering that accompanies their enforcement. When Iraq invaded Kuwait
in the spring of 1991, the U.S. government encouraged a Kurdish revolt in
northern Iraq. In an appeal broadcast into Iraq, President Bush declared, "there's
another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the
Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands to force Saddam Hussein, the
dictator, to step aside." 2"
The Kurds, believing they had the support of the international community,
began a rebellion. The revolt was enormously popular, and many Kurds
attributed their support to past persecution by the Iraqi government. 258 Thus,
the violation of their rights led many Kurds to support an armed rebellion that
threatened the territorial integrity of the state of Iraq. Within days the Kurds
controlled nearly every city in the north. Once the uprising began, however, the
Bush Administration began to fear the disintegration of Iraq, and therefore
distanced itself from the Kurdish rebels. Without international support, the
uprising quickly collapsed.259
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Iraqi forces killed thousands of unarmed civilians as they regained control
of the Kurdish area, and the international community refused to intervene on the
civilians' behalf. A U.S. soldier reported that "[Iraqi forces] fired at the hospital
twice. We were watching them shell the train station and other small houses.
This was simply designed to kill civilians or terrorize them, which it did. It did
not have a military purpose, just artillery impacts on large concentrations of
civilians."2' Thousands fled the Ba'ath persecution, reportedly over ten
percent of the country's population. Iran received 1.4 million Iraqis, Turkey
450,000, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait together received 35,000, and smaller
numbers went to Syria and Jordan.26'
In response to this massive flow of refugees, the U.N. Security Council
passed Resolution 688 which criticized Iraq for creating a threat to international
peace and security through its treatment of its citizens, and provided the basis for
humanitarian relief efforts.2 62 This resolution is unique. It declares that a state
may be subject to intervention for the repression of its citizens if the repression
causes a massive refugee problem and political instability in neighboring
states.2 63 To provide aid and prevent a further refugee crisis, the Allies began
flying humanitarian relief missions to aid the Kurds in northern Iraq. In June,
the U.S. House of Representatives, recognizing that the repression of the Kurds
continued, passed Resolution 299, which created a safe haven north of the 36th
parallel in an attempt to induce Kurdish refugees to return to Iraq.2 64
The establishment of a Kurdish-controlled zone in northeast Iraq under some
measure of Allied supervision has.helped to deter Iraqi attacks, and temporarily
place the Iraqi Kurds beyond the reach of the Ba'ath regime. However, many
Kurds are convinced that if the international presence is removed, a major
offensive to retake the Kurdish-held zone will be launched, which would
undoubtedly prompt another Kurdish exodus."6
In May 1992, the Iraqi Kurds took advantage of their protected autonomy
and held elections for a Kurdistan National Assembly and a leader of the
Kurdistan Liberation Movement. The elections were organized by the Kurdistan
Front, a coalition of eight Kurdish parties, without the approval of the Ba'ath
regime and with almost no international support.2" The elections resulted in
a tie between the KDP, led by Massoud Barzani, and the PUK, led by Jalal
Talabani.267 The main issue distinguishing the two parties was whether to
negotiate with Saddam Hussein, in hopes of winning autonomy within Iraq
(KDP), or to refrain from negotiating with him and to seek instead a federal
arrangement with a subsequent government in Baghdad (PUK).268 Each party
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gained fifty seats in the 105-seat National Assembly, and two leaders now
govern together in a coalition format seeking a federated status within Iraq.269
Despite international protection, the Iraqi government is nevertheless
continuing its siege on the Kurds on several fronts. Economically, the Kurdish
region is suffering from a "double embargo": one imposed by the international
community on Iraq on the basis of Security Council Resolution 661,270 and one
imposed by the Iraqi government on the Kurdish region from which the
government withdrew its administration in the autumn of 1991 after the uprising
and creation of a safe haven.27' The internal blockade on Kurdish areas
imposed by the Iraqi regime, has had a disastrous effect on the region's econo-
my.27 2 Specifically, the Government has withdrawn its administrative services,
including social security and welfare support, on the grounds that it was forced
out by the foreign occupation, yet on the other hand it argues that it is justified
in restricting economic flows to the region as a matter of sovereignty over the
territory, thus leaving almost 4 million inhabitants in a most disadvantaged and
precarious position.273 They are dependent on $145 million in annual emergen-
cy aid through the United Nations, and their lives are secured by U.S., British
and French planes that fly daily over the protected zone north of the 36th parallel
to keep Iraqi troops at bay.
274
The Kurds are being deprived of food and fuel in an attempt to collectively
punish those in the region for the relative success of the 1991 uprising and
undermine the locally elected government. For example, the food rations
available to those in the region have been reduced to approximately seven to ten
percent of need. In addition, continued armed attacks on agricultural fields and
settlements have kept farmers from growing their own food.275 Other means
of governmental sabotage include deadly attacks on humanitarian organizations
providing food and medical assistance, planting bombs in relief convoys which
explode upon reaching the Kurdish region, cutting the electricity supply, planting
of land mines in non-combat zones to make large areas of Kurdish territory
uninhabitable, and poisoning relief aid.27 6 "The dictatorial regime in Iraq does
not hesitate over perpetuating the ugliest crimes against human rights in the
Kurdish region., 277 There is, as the Special Rapporteur described it, a "reign
of terror" by the regime of Saddam Hussein against the people of Iraq.278
In summary, the position of the Iraqi Kurds is paradoxical: although they
possess greater de jure rights than Kurds in any other state, the de facto
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repression of these rights has been monumental. Genocide, the attempt to
eradicate the group itself, constitutes the ultimate violation of group rights. As
one scholar noted,
[d]espite the theoretical cultural autonomy which Iraq's three million Kurds enjoy,
and which is unknown in neighboring Turkey or Iran, the massacres of Kurdish
guerilla ... and civilians which followed the end of the Iran-Iraq war are perhaps
a more significant indicator of Iraqi policies towards the Kurds.279
E. The Kurds in Iran
Kurdish relations with the government of Iran have generally been as
contentious as their relations with the Turkish government, although this hostility
has been expressed less brutally. The lack of brutality results in large part from
the presence of other minorities in Iranian territory, which therefore makes the
creation of a homogenous nation-state unrealistic. 20
When Reza Khan gained power following World War I, his initial concern
was ensuring the integrity of the state. 28' Because the state included various
group within its territory, Reza Khan feared that if one group separated, other
groups would follow and the state would disintegrate. Several groups engaged
in separatist uprisings in the years following World War I, the most serious of
which was the 1921 Kurdish revolt led by Chief Isma'il Shakkak Simko. This
revolt, as well as others throughout Iran in the 1920s and 1930s, was successful-
ly suppressed by the Iranian government 2
During World War II, both the British and the Soviets opposed Reza Khan
because they feared he would transform his pro-German sympathies into a
military alliance. Thus, they invaded Iran: the Soviets occupying northern Iran
and the British occupying the south. A power vacuum developed in the Kurdish
region between the two zones, and there the Kurds gained some autonomy over
local affairs.283
At the time of their invasion, the Allies had promised to withdraw from Iran
by March 1946. As the deadline approached, both the Kurds and Azerbaijanis
attempted to take advantage of the power shift and form their own independent
states. The Kurds established the Republic of Mahabad in December 1945, and
within a few days the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDPI) formed a government
under the leadership of Qasi Muhammad. 284 Despite its small size, the Mahbad
Republic was full of division which led to its demise within a year of its
founding. In 1946, Iranian troops regained control of the region. Soon after
Qasi Muhammad was executed and the expression of Kurdish identity was
banned.285
Kurdish resistance went underground. It remained there until the 1958
rehabilitation of Barzani in Iraq. Barzani worked closely with the leadership of
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the KDPI, which instigated the use of guerilla tactics against the Iranian regime.
Soon, however, Barzani started receiving support from the Shah of Iran, and he
terminated his cooperation with those Kurds operating inside of Iran. Without
Barzani's support, the movement inside Iran collapsed and the Iranian army led
a successful campaign against the Kurds in 1967-68.286 The Iranian govern-
ment thus maintained the dual policy of supporting Kurds in Iraq but suppressing
those in Iran. In response, the Iraqi government provided support for Iranian
Kurds until the signing of the Algiers Agreement in 1975.287
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 presented the Kurds with an unprecedented
opportunity to gain autonomy, as the state structure collapsed and no foreign
power intervened. The KDPI became the predominant political force in Iranian
Kurdistan, and through the KDPI the Kurds demanded autonomy.288 The
revolutionary government that came to power, however, did not look favorably
on Kurdish separatism. The foundation of its power was the unity of the Islamic
community, a central tenet of its religious beliefs. Kurdish separatist demands
were rejected and the government refused to acknowledge the Kurds as a
minority. In fact, the only minorities recognized in the new constitution were
religious minorities.289 In addition to its religious objections to the splintering
of the Islamic community, the Khomeini regime also feared the domino effect
of granting autonomy to the Kurds who were just one of several minorities.
From early 1979 until the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war eighteen months later,
Kurdish relations with the government involved successive hostilities and
negotiations.29
In 1980, Iraq reneged on the Algiers Agreement and invaded Iran, allowing
the first opportunity for Iranian and Iraqi Kurds to work in tandem for autonomy.
Unfortunately, not only were the Kurds unable to coordinate their efforts, but
they were also used as pawns by both governments. Kurds on both sides of the
border experienced tremendous losses. Following the end of the war in 1988,
the Kurds again entered into a series of hostilities and negotiations with the
Khomeini regime. Presently the Kurdish region, unlike the rest of Iran, is
effectively under military control, and violations of human rights are common.
Prohibitions against cultural manifestations of the Kurdish identity have relaxed
to some degree; for instance, it is no longer illegal to publish materials in the
Kurdish language. Religious discrimination against Kurds, however, per-
sists. 2
91
F The Kurds in Syria
The Kurds form a small proportion of Syrian society, comprising only eight
percent of the total population.292 This population is concentrated along the
Syrian-Turkish border. While some Kurds came to Syria following the collapse
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of the Ottoman Empire, the majority were fleeing the increased Turkish
repression of the 1920s.293
Initially, there was little tension in the relationship between Syrians and
Kurds. Persecution of minorities was rare, and there was no vocal Kurdish
desire for autonomy. This relationship changed in 1958, when Syria and Egypt
established the United Arab Republic. The focus on Arab culture led to
increased pressure on the Kurds. The Kurds protested by demanding a more
democratic form of government and recognition as an ethnic group. Their
government responded by increasing their oppression and harassment.294
The United Arab Republic fell in 1961, and a new regime came to power
two years later with an anti-Kurdish policy. An "Arab Belt" plan was
formulated, which involved the aggressive settlement of Arabs in Kurdish areas
and the withdrawal of Syrian citizenship from 100,000 Kurds.295 Beginning
in 1973, Syria's Kurdish policy reflected its policy toward Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.
Syria cooperated to some degree with the Kurdish movement in Iraq, maintained
a mildly positive stance toward Turkish Kurds, and after 1979 was hostile to
Iranian Kurds.296  Regarding its own Kurds, persecution eased and the
government officially renounced the "Arab Belt" plan in 1976. The Kurds are
not, however, recognized as a separate ethnic group.
VI. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
OF THE VIOLATION OF GROUP RIGHTS
The case study of the Kurds clearly illustrates that the violation of group
rights often leads to violence. As one scholar noted in reference to the right of
self-determination, "the violence we see around us is not generated by the drive
for self-determination, but by its negation. The denial of self-determination, not
its pursuit, is what leads to upheavals and conflicts. ' 297 This sentiment is just
as applicable to other minority rights as well.
Aside from moral concerns, the treatment of groups and their subsequent
reactions, are of concern to the international community for both domestic and
international reasons. Domestically, this issue affects nearly all states. Complete
homogeneity in a state is the exception rather than the rule, and oppression of
minority groups is not limited by either ideology or geography. It has been
argued that one of the major causes of violence and political strife is the
assertion by minority groups of rights to self-government and political autonomy
and the repression by governments of such groups.29
The treatment of groups is important in the international context because of
the role groups can play in the. maintenance of international peace and security.
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One reason that governments' treatment of groups can have international
ramifications is that a minority in one state is often a majority in another.2
Thus, group conflicts can easily embroil an entire region. It has been noted that
"[m]inority tensions as they have in the past and as they will continue to be in
the present will jeopardize international peace and stability which in today's
world of evermore destructive weapons takes on a completely new dimen-
sion. '' 300 An example of the political ramifications of these group conflicts was
the stalled removal of Russian troops from the Baltic states to protect the
treatment of ethnic Russians. Group conflicts also have international repercus-
sions because of the refugee flows which often result, such as the flow of
Rwandans out of their ethnically war-torn country.30 ' Thus, the position of
groups within states is of strategic importance to the entire international
community.
VII. PROPOSALS FOR THE PROTECTION OF GROUP RIGHTS
A. The Inadequacy of Current Mechanisms
Current implementation procedures are incapable of providing the early-
warning, preventive diplomacy necessary to control group hostilities. This is
clearly illustrated by the case of the Kurds. The dominant pattern in the
behavior of the states of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran in relation to the Kurds
can be described as follows:
[i]n normal times a policy of assimilation, a forced integration and a policy of
denying Kurdish identity. In times of conflicts a ruthless policy of destruction and
near genocidal measures and methods; in times of strong Kurdish resistance,
especially in times of weakness in the political foundations of those states, they
cede some rights and some form of recognition.'
Nevertheless, the international community failed to address the Kurds' plight
until both the portrayal of Saddam Hussein as a ruthless dictator, and the security
threat caused by their mass exodus, made it politically expedient to do so.
Traditionally, states have limited the role of the international community to
crisis management once group conflicts have escalated. The eruption of violent
group conflicts around the globe has, however, awakened states to the need for
crisis prevention. As U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated in his
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Agenda for Peace, "[t]he time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty ... has
passed; its theory was never matched by reality.
30 3
The various mechanisms for implementation and enforcement of group
rights within the United Nations, the CSCE,3° 4 and the Council of Europe all
include one inherent deficiency: they exclude the groups themselves from the
processes which are meant to guarantee their rights. All of these mechanisms
are limited to state actors, and although in certain circumstances individuals have
standing, groups are uniformly excluded. The fear of giving minorities an
internationally recognized presence has resulted in denying them access to the
mechanisms meant to protect them. States are thus the only actors capable of
initiating procedures to protect group rights. States are by nature, however,
political bodies, and political factors weigh heavily in the decisions of states to
criticize one another on their treatment of groups. This reliance on state
initiation results in the inability of the international community to adequately
address the concerns of groups. This in turn leads many groups to conclude that
they must resort to violence in order to gain global attention and plead their
cause.
To ensure the preservation of the current state system, a mechanism must
be developed that alerts the international community and alleviates group tension
before it escalates. In order to accomplish this goal, both parties to the conflict,
groups and states, must have an opportunity to utilize the mechanisms.
B. The Need for Independence
The essential requirement for a new mechanism to effectively enforce group
rights is independent administration. There are several reasons why indepen-
dence from the state system is required. The first is that a state's primary
concerns revolve around their political agenda, and thus the treatment of groups
is often dependent on political expedience. This is aptly illustrated by the
experience of the Kurds. As the current escalation of group conflicts across the
globe indicates, states are not diligent in alerting the international community to,
domestic problems with their minority groups. The onus of protecting group
rights should be removed from state control.
A related reason supporting independence from the state-based system is the
need for expediency. Action must be initiated at the first indication of a crisis
in order to adequately respond to the violation and prevent group conflicts. If
included in a state-based system, there is great potential for states to obstruct
action with which they disagree.
Another fundamental reason for independence is to ensure that states and
groups receive equal treatment with the procedural mechanism. Organs within
the state-based system are notoriously political, and even these organs,
theoretically comprised of independent experts, have political aspects. Thus,
even if a new organ is created with additional safeguards against political
303. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 1, at 9.
304. While the creation of the High Commissioner on National Minorities alleviated this deficiency
somewhat in the CSCE system, the limits on the High Commissioner's mandate regarding sources of
information and escalation of conflicts limits his/her effectiveness. See supra IV.B.
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maneuvering, it is unlikely that groups will trust such an organ if it is
administered within a renowned political institution. Only if groups trust the
independence of the mechanism will they rely on it to address their grievances,
therefore alleviating their need to resort to violence and contributing to the
preservation of the state system as it currently exists.
C. The Current "Window of Opportunity"
Innovation in the protection of human rights requires the presence of two
interrelated factors: normative standards and social forces committed to their
implementation.3"5 As one scholar has postulated, the law should be used to
create a normative framework which makes it easier for politicians to do what
they have to do.306 The development of group rights thus far has resulted in
the establishment of a firm normative basis. The presence of the second require-
ment, the commitment to implementation, is already evident in the movement
away from a deferential view of sovereignty, both in relations among states and
in the expansion of permissible areas of inquiry into the affairs of individual
states. One example is the use of Security Council Resolution 688 as the legal
basis for entry into Iraq to provide assistance and protection of the Kurdish
refugees.30 7
The international community currently has an extraordinary opportunity to
provide for the protection of group rights by creating an independently-
administered mechanism, and by allowing minority groups access to such a
mechanism. States' fears of giving groups international legal standing should no
longer prevent the development of effective enforcement techniques, and as
evident in the statements of the U.N. Secretary-General, even states recognize
that the current system falls far short of what is required. Similar fears were
voiced in regard to expanding the subject of international law to include
individuals during the genesis of human rights law, and it took the horrors of
World War II to provide the political impetus to provide international standing
to individuals and the creation of mechanisms for their protection. A similar
political impetus for the granting of international standing for groups has
occurred in the wake of conflicts underway in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Rwanda, and
elsewhere. The decline of the Cold War also removed an impediment to
international cooperation.
D. One Possibility: The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization
The conclusion seems clear that to effectively protect group rights, and thus
prevent conflict, groups must be given access to a protective mechanism within
the auspices of an independent, non-state-based organization. One such
organization already exists: The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization
(UNPO). Before it was even three years old, this organization was nominated
for one of the international community's greatest honors, the Nobel Peace Prize.
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Founded in February 1991, UNPO is an organization comprised of "nations"
that do not have their own states, and thus are inadequately represented in the
state-based system.3°" The organization was created by the groups themselves
to promote their aspirations through peaceful means. As its Covenant states, "the
non-recognition of a majority of Nations and Peoples by intergovernmental
organizations and the absence of meaningful venues for the expression and
enforcement of their aspirations and rights often leads to violence.' " UNPO
was therefore created to fill this void by providing an international forum for
groups.
The term "unrepresented nations and peoples" covers a broad spectrum,
including occupied countries and colonies, cultural or ethnic minorities, and in
certain cases majorities, indigenous peoples and federated states. A nation or
people is defined, for purposes of membership in UNPO, as "a group of human
beings which possesses the will to be identified as a nation or people and to,
determine its common destiny as a nation or people."3 ° Thus, the definition
focuses on self-perception. This subjective criterion, however, must be based on
an objectively ascertainable "common heritage" which binds the group. This
common heritage "can be historical, racial, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious,
or territorial. 3 1 In addition, for purposes of membership, "a section of People
constituting a minority, living on a portion of its ancestral territory, incorporated
into a State other than a State representing that People" is included in the
definition.312
UNPO currently has forty-three members and four supporting states,
representing over 130 million people, and applications for membership are
received continuously. 313 In addition to meeting the definitional requirements
of a people, those requesting membership must also establish that they are
recognized by a substantial section of the people as their representative.31 4
They must also pledge adherence to the principle of an equal right to self-
determination of all nations and peoples, internationally accepted human rights
standards, the principle of democracy, and rejection of totalitarianism and
religious intolerance. Finally, "[i]n accordance with the fundamental objectives
of UNPO, to create an effective alternative to violence in advancing the interests
and aspirations of peoples," members must agree to use peaceful means to
308. Covenant of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, Feb. 11, 1991 (available from
UNPO General Secretariat, Javastraat 40A, 2585 AP, The Hague, The Netherlands) [hereinafter UNPO
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achieve their goals.315 Thus, a group is not excluded because it has used
violence in the past as long as it is willing to forego violence in the future.
To achieve its purpose of promoting the views of its members before the
need for violence arises, UNPO provides various services. It offers advice on
legal issues and on the utilization of various mechanisms within the United
Nations and other international organizations. UNPO created the Urgent Action
Council (UAC) to effectively respond to violations. This emergency mechanism
is comprised of an equal number of UNPO members and prominent individuals.
The UAC's mandate provides for the performance of three interrelated functions:
fact-finding, election monitoring, and mediation.316 A request for action may
be submitted by an UNPO Member, or another group sponsored by a member.
UNPO's Steering Committee and General Assembly are also authorized to
initiate an action.
The UAC is similar in principle to the Moscow Mechanism of the CSCE,
although it has the distinct advantage of direct access to the groups involved.
Through its contact with the groups, UNPO becomes apprised of the violations
of their rights at an early stage. This allows the groups to gain international
attention and diminishes the need to resort to violence. Access to the groups
gives UNPO the information necessary to take an active stance in conflicts
before they escalate, therefore providing an opportunity for effective conflict
resolution and preventative diplomacy. It provides for the resolution of group
conflicts and the preservation of the state-based system.
Currently, financial support for UNPO comes from governments, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), foundations, corporations, or individual
donors. The international community should recognize the valuable role that an
independent, non-political organization such as UNPO can play in the protection
of group rights and the resolution of group conflicts. Without mechanisms such
as the UAC, the resolution of group conflicts will be hampered by political
maneuvering. The international community should provide the financial support
necessary for the continuation of UNPO projects such as the UAC. One
possibility would be to allocate a portion of the United Nations' budget for
UNPO activities.
It is time for the international community to take an active role in
preventing the violation of group rights and the escalation of group conflicts.
Given the momentum created by demonstrations of unbridled group hostility in
Bosnia-Hercegovina and Rwanda, and the recognition that current mechanisms
are ineffective in enforcing group rights, it is an ideal opportunity to make the
leap from normative goals to effective implementation. An organization such as
UNPO provides a prototype for the kind of independent, non-political body
which has the access to the groups involved which is necessary to protect their
rights.
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